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  • 學位論文

魚與熊掌︰為何中國經改延誤民主?

Why China's Economic Reform Has Delayed Its Transition Toward Western-style Democracy

指導教授 : 楊永明

摘要


中國大陸一連串經濟改革對於中國社會與政治整體而言扮演相當重要的作用。在一定程度上,經濟發展對於民主具有推拉因素︰一方面而言,經濟改革對於推動政治自由化有相當的激勵作用;另一方面而言,中國經濟改革在某種程度卻有相反的作用,使中國偏離政治自由化的民主進程。一般而言,亞洲四小龍的經濟發展與政治自由化的經驗主要有賴於隨著經濟增長而漸增的的體制基礎,為多元化與非正式組織的組成提供體制上的發展可能。 截至目前為止,中國經濟發展經驗卻為中國政治獨斷帶來增強的效果,幾十年的經濟改革使中國偏離西方理論的預期成為一個經濟發展與政治體制的例外;換句話說,中國經改加強了中央權力鞏固的效果,使中國共產黨免於政治的脆弱性和合法性的危機,這在多數東歐社會主義國家經濟改革的經驗並不多見,尤其在經濟轉型的過渡期中,政治自由化的推動往往造成政權的崩潰與社會的動盪;然而這在中國的轉型經驗中並不存在。本篇論文對於其中的因果解釋在於︰在經濟改革過程中的中產階級並未要求政治自由化。在一般西方民主轉型文獻當中,中產階級常是促進與推定的重要推手,然而在在中國經驗當中,中產階級對於推動政治民主化並不積極,他們既不同情廣大的農工階級,也沒興趣成為領導政治自由化的反對勢力。此外,中國的企業家也不具有推動政治轉型的積極性,相反的是,他們樂於與政府保持良好關係,在某種程度上忠實地支持政權以維護他們的特殊地位。對於中國企業家而言,與政治統治集團保持良好的互動關係能相對鞏固經濟上的特權,因為對於不斷追求利潤的企業家而言,政治上的闢蔭對於商業利潤的追求有絕對的促進效果。 由上而下的層面觀察,中國共產黨展現了驚人的適應能力,不僅透過政策來回應變動中的社會關係,同時也透過與社會的合作關係緩解政治改革的壓力。未來中國共產黨仍會將經濟改革、社會的和諧與穩定視為首要目標,希冀用以維護並持續長久以來的政治權力壟斷。

並列摘要


The sequence of Chinese reforms has a major overall effect on the political and social landscape of the country. To some extent, economic development is certainly a push- pull factor that makes China move toward or deviate from the path of political liberalization. In the case of China, as the paper proposed, it deviates from the developmental experience of the Asian four tigers, where growth of the physical economy brings about the emerging institutional basis for the country’s intellectual pluralism and informal institutions. In other words, the two-decades of economic reform has made China an exception that is immune from political vulnerability and a legitimacy crisis that most Eastern European socialist economies had experienced during the transition period. The basic reason is that the rising middle class has not demanded democracy but has cooperated with the Party, though it is widely assumed to be politically assertive and autonomous from the government in the political science literature. Moreover, Chinese entrepreneurs are not agitating for democratic demands either; instead, they represent a vast majority of interest groups in pursuit of profit maximization and to loyally support the regime in exchange for the preservation of their special positions. As the paper argues, China’s private entrepreneurs are found to be politically introverted and willing to maintain some kind of good relationship with the state. On the top-down level, the Chinese Communist Party has shown incredible adaptability to a changing political environment through its recruitment policies. The cooptation policy, cooperation policy and cadre evaluation system make the party more capable of dealing with the legitimacy issue in response to the changing societal relationship, and consequently to ignore pressures for political change. In the foreseeable future, the Chinese Communist Party is expected to consistently highlight the priority of the country’s economic development, social harmony and stability, which enable the regime to hold a political monopoly.

參考文獻


Barry Naughton, “Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform 1978-1993,” Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Lowell Dittmer and Guoli Lu eds, “Domestic Politics in Transition: China’s Deep Reform,” New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Adam Prezworski, “Modernization: Theories and Facts," World Politics, vol. 49, no. 2, 1997.
Adam Prezworski et al., “Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990”, London: Cambridge University Press, 2000
Albert Park, Scott Rozelle, Christine Wong and Changqin Ren, “Distributional Consequence of Reforming Local Finance in China,” China Quarterly, Vol. 147, 1996, pp. 751-778.

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