會計盈餘反應訊息時效性之不對稱與投資複雜度之關係

本論文研究投資複雜度對會計盈餘反應訊息時效性之不對稱的影響。多數的研究採用Basu之定義，將盈餘反應壞消息較好消息快速視為公司是否採用保守會計之指標；除了藉經濟利益與損失認列速度之不一致以證實會計穩健的存在，很多的研究發現會計上的保守可抵消經理人高估公司績效的動機，進而減輕管理階層與股東間之代理問題。本研究預期在某些情況下之投資的特性可能會影響會計穩健原則所扮演之效率角色。因此，在本研究中投資複雜度以三個面向來表示，分別是：(1)以交叉持股或金字塔方式之投資 (2)是否投資於中國大陸 (3)投資多角化之程度；從此三方向調查對盈餘品質的影響，換言之，即探討投資複雜之程度愈高會否使得會計上更及時地認列經濟損失。本實證結果發現，控制公司成長性、財務風險與公司治理之後，擁有較高投資複雜度之公司，其在會計上顯得更加地保守。此結果與保守會計一致，可協助與公司相關的個體減少其代理成本。

關鍵字

會計盈餘及時性；會計穩健保守原則；投資複雜度；投資中國大陸；多角化

並列摘要

This thesis would like to address whether firms with more complex investments exhibit higher conservatism than firms without. Applying Basu‘s definition, most studies regard 'earnings reflecting bad news more quickly than good news' as an indicator of conservatism. A lot of researches have found that conservatism manifested by the differential speed in the recognition of economic gains and losses could counteract managers‘ incentives to overstate firm performance and mitigate the agency problem between management and shareholders. This study predicts that complex investments are highly associated with agency costs and investors/creditors would require higher conservatism to reduce the costs. In this research, complex investments are explored across three dimensions: (1) Investments in firms with cross-holding or pyramid structure (2) Investment in China (3) Diversification level of investment, and this paper explores the association between the investment complexity and the quality of earnings – timely recognition of economic losses. Findings are that firms with higher investment complexity are associated with more conservative earnings. The results hold after controlling for firm growth, financial risk and corporate governance structure.

並列關鍵字

accounting conservatism ； asymmetric timeliness ； complex investments ； investment in China ； diversification

參考文獻

Abdel-Khalik, A.R., Wong, K.A., Wu, A. (1999) The information environment of China‘s A and B shares: Can we make sense of numbers. The International Journal of Accounting, 34, 467–489.

Aggarwal, R.K. and Samwick, A.A. (2003) Why do managers diversify their firms? Agency reconsidered, Journal of Finance, 58, 71–118.

Ahmed, A., Duellman, S. (2007) Accounting conservatism and board of director characteristics: An empirical analysis, Journal of Accounting and Economics 43, 411–437.

Ahmed, A., Duellman, S. (2008) Evidence on the Role of Accounting Conservatism in Monitoring Managers‘ Investment Decisions, AAA Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Paper, 2008, 1–47.

Almazan, A., Hartzell, J.C. and Starks, L.T. (2005) Active institutional shareholders and costs of monitoring: Evidence from executive compensation, Financial Management, 34, 5–34.

國際替代計量

會計盈餘反應訊息時效性之不對稱與投資複雜度之關係

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