公司治理與金融風暴的事件研究-以台灣LED產業為例

Corporate Governance and Capability to Secure from Extrnal Shocks: An Event Study of the LED firms in Taiwan

胡榮宗(Jung-Chung Hu)

指導教授 ： 賈昭南

淡江大學/商管學院/國際企業學系碩士在職專班/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2013.00097

摘要

本文首先利用事件研究分析法，檢視2008年第3季美國次級房貸金融風暴事件發生後，台灣地區LED產業15家樣本公司的營業收益，所受衝擊以及其復原狀況。然後，將樣本公司依四種不同的股權結構加以分類，比較各類別公司因應外來不利衝擊的表現。實證研究結果顯示，當時液晶顯示器的背光源正由冷陰極管轉換到LED，有跨足至液晶顯示背光源的公司，在因應外來衝擊方面的能力較優。「董監持股比例」較低的群體，其因應外來衝擊的能力較優。而「外資持股比例」較高的群體在面對事件衝擊之表現較佳；此外，「國內法人持股比例」較高、「十大股東持股比例」較高的群體，在面對事件衝擊之表現也較佳，但效果沒有外資持股較高的群體來的明顯。

關鍵字：次級房貸風暴、LED產業、股權結構

關鍵字

次級房貸風暴 ； LED產業 ； 股權結構

並列摘要

This thesis applies the event study analysis method to analysis the impacts and the subsequent recovery of the 2008 U.S. subprime financial crisis on the operating incomes of the 15 companies selected from the LED industries in Taiwan. Comparisons of the performances are made next to evaluate the differences of groups of companies divided in accordance with four corporate governance factors. The empirical results have shown that companies which have extended their products line to include the more advanced cold cathode tube LED to replace the old LCD backlight technology perform better following the adverse situation. Groups with lower proportions of shares held by the "Major Shareholders" possess better capability in coping with the external shocks and perform better. On the contrary, groups with higher proportions of shares held by the foreign institute investors, by the ten largest shareholders and by the domestic institute investors all perform better than otherwise, while the former outperformed the latter two groups.

Key Words:Subprime mortgage crisis, LED industry, Equity structure

並列關鍵字

Subprime mortgage crisis ； LED industry ； Equity structure

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