一九五零年代美國對兩次台海危機的決策過程研究

本論文以艾里遜 (Graham T. Allison) 決策理論之「理性行為者模式、組織行為模式、政府政治模式」為主要分析架構，以兩次台海危機為案例研究，來檢視艾森豪政府在危機期間的決策過程，並以此過程研究之分析及討論，提出三個假設，以檢視該理論之適用性。除此之外，筆者也將比較分析法納入此研究，冀望賦予此論文更完整全面性的分析。在第一次台海危機爆發後，美國對於是否要介入台海危機深感困擾，一方面選擇介入恐會引起更大規模與中共或甚至蘇聯的戰爭；另一方面，若選擇不介入，恐會損害美國的威嚴引起更大的政治效應。對於台海問題，美國將之稱為進退兩難的難題，對於此難題，艾森豪政府決定將其置於聯合國來解決，並與台灣簽訂中美共同防禦條約與台灣決議案，以使台灣接受聯合國之停火安排及退出大陳島。第二次台海危機再次爆發時，因為外島已有近三分之一的國軍駐防，因此美國只能選擇介入，這次，焦點變成如何介入而非要不要介入，最後，美國選擇有限度的介入，以提供護航的方式使國軍的補給能夠安全的到達外島。雖然艾森豪政府在兩次危機都沒有啟動軍事行動，然而軍事行動甚至是核子武器一直都是備案，各組織都盡最大努力希望其建議會受總統採用，如果案子被化為政策執行軍事行動，就可以使將其組織之價值凸顯出來。這樣的情形特別是第一次台海危機的核子武器使用上更為明顯，原因是當時在大規模毀滅的策略下，大部分的軍種對執行該任務都很有興趣。然而此種情形在第二次台海危機時，起了一些變化。由於當時蘇聯之核武器已發展成熟，所以在第二次危機時，美國對使用核武器的態度相對保守很多。總的來說，美國對此兩次台海危機的外交策略雖有一些調整，但所有的政策及策略，都是以美國最大的利益為準。

關鍵字

艾里遜決策理論；艾森豪政府；台海危機；決策過程

並列摘要

The paper laid the foundation on Graham T. Allison’s three decision-making models-the Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and the Governmental Politics Model (GPM) as the theoretical structure to explore the formulation of U.S. foreign policy during the two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s. In order to make the analysis more comprehensive, I also adopted the comparative analysis method to present the evolution of the decision-making process of the two Crises. By doing so, I established three hypotheses from the theory and applied them in the two case studies to verify application of the theory. When these offshore islands were under heavy attack in the first Strait Crisis, whether or not the U.S. should defend these offshore islands for Taiwan was “ a horrible dilemma” to the Eisenhower administration and put the U.S. in a difficult situation to deal with due to its extensive political implications. On the one hand, the U.S. was unwilling to run the risk of waging war with Communist China or even Soviet Union. On the other hand, it did not want to lose its prestige because of staying out of the Strait conflict. Considering all the courses of actions, the U.S. attempted to resolve the Crisis by passing the dilemma to the U.N, signing the Sino-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and concluding the Formosa Resolution with Taiwan in exchange for ROC’s acceptance of the U.N. arrangement and withdrawal from Tachens. When the second Crisis occurred in 1958, with nearly one third of ROC troops stationed on the islands, the dilemma therefore was not to intervene or not but how to intervene to suit U.S. best interest. The Eisenhower administration decided to provide escort operation for safety landing of ROC’s supplies. Although the Eisenhower administration did not take military actions in the event of both Strait Crises, utilization of nuclear weapons as well as military actions were widely discussed and prepared. Various organizations had tried to have their proposals of military actions adopted by President Eisenhower so that they could stand out their organizational values. In particular, the employment of nuclear weapons was seriously considered under the ”Massive Retaliation Strategy.” While in the 1958 Crisis, the posture of Eisenhower administration toward utilization of atomic weapons became relatively conservative in light of the Soviets progress of its nuclear weapons. The overall policy of Eisenhower administration did undergo some changes; nevertheless, the adjustments all served U.S. best interests.

並列關鍵字

Rational Actor Model (RAM) ； the Organizational Behavior Model (OBM) ； Governmental Politics Model (GPM)

參考文獻

Gelb Leslie H. Anglo-American Relations, 1945-1949: Towards a Theory of Alliances. New York: Garland Publications, 1988.

Leslie Gelb H. Anglo-American Relations. 1945-1949: Towards a Theory of Alliances. New York: Garland Publications,1988.

Stoeckel, Wayne R. The Role of the Military in Strategic

Beal, John Robinson. John Foster Dulles: A Biography. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959.

Accinelli, Robert. Crisis and Commitment: United Stated Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

國際替代計量

一九五零年代美國對兩次台海危機的決策過程研究

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