公司治理與金融風暴的事件研究-以台灣營建業產業為例

Corporate Governance and Capability to Secure External Shocks:An Event of Architecture Industry in Taiwan

蘇書弘(Shu-Hung Su)

指導教授 ： 賈昭南

淡江大學/商管學院/國際企業學系碩士在職專班/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2013.00233

摘要

本研究首先利用事件分析法，探索2008年第三季美國次級房貸風暴事件發生後，台灣地區營建業14家樣本公司的稅後利潤受到的衝擊以及其復原狀況。其次，將樣本公司依四種不同的股權結構分類，比較各類別群體因應此外來不利衝擊的能力。實證研究結果顯示，凡有擴大營業範圍從事異業投資活動特徵的公司，在因應衝擊的表現較好，而董監持股與十大股東持股比例較高，以及國內法人持股與外資持股比例較低的群體表現較優。

關鍵字

次級房貸風暴 ； 營建業 ； 股權結構

並列摘要

This thesis first applies the event study analysis method to examine the impacts and the restorations of the after tax profits of the 14 firms of the construction industries in Taiwan after the 2008 U.S. subprime financial crisis. Then the firms are categorized into two groups based on four different shareholder structures to compare the capabilities in coping with the adverse external impact. The empirical event studies have shown that firms that have invested in extended area other than constructions performed better and that groups with higher proportions of shareholdings by the board members and by the top ten largest shareholders performed better than those with lower shareholdings proportions. On the contrary, firms with lower proportions of shareholdings by the domestic institute investor and the foreign institute investors performed better.

並列關鍵字

subprime mortgage crisis ； the construction industry ； ownership structure

參考文獻

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