美國國家安全會議於對華外交決策過程之角色：以艾森豪、甘迺迪及尼克森政府為例

The Roles of the National Security Council in the U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process toward China: Case Studies on Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nixon Administrations

陳仲志(Alexander Chung-chih Chen)

指導教授 ： 陳一新

淡江大學/國際研究學院/美國研究所博士班/博士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2008.00567

摘要

回顧美國國家安全會議成立迄今，由於歷任總統對國安會之運用方式不同，使國安會在對華外交決策過程中亦扮演不同的角色。因此，本論文主要研究目的為分析國安會於艾森豪、甘迺迪及尼克森政府時期對華外交決策過程中之角色。

本文試圖從總統對國安顧問之仰賴度及國安會之功能兩大面向，建構國安會於對華外交決策過程之角色的分析模式，並以決策理論為主，揉合國際體系理論、聯盟理論，針對前述各時期的重要案例進行分析，包括：艾森豪時期的第一次及第二次臺海危機、甘迺迪時期的中國代表權及第三次臺海危機、尼克森時期的中國代表權與美中關係正常化。

在艾森豪政府任內，美國在因應兩次臺海危機的決策過程中，雖然國安會對決策環境的評估與艾森豪總統想法相近，但由於艾森豪總統對國務卿杜勒斯相當仰賴，連帶弱化國家安全事務特別助理的角色，使國安會僅發揮協調部門歧見之功能。此一情況符合本論文所建構之模式Ⅱ（國家安全顧問在決策過程中並未受到總統的倚重，致使國安會的功能僅以協調管理各部門政策歧見為主）。

再就甘迺迪時期而言，美國在因應中國代表權及第三次臺海危機的決策過程中，由於國安會對決策環境的評估與甘迺迪總統的想法有所不同，因此雖然總統對國家安全特別助理彭岱多所倚重，但國安會在對華外交決策中能發揮的功能仍然有限。此一情況符合本論文所建構之模式I（國家安全顧問在決策過程中受到總統的倚重，但國安會的功能卻以協調管理各部門政策歧見為主）。

而就尼克森時期而言，美國在因應中國代表權及美中關係正常化的決策過程中，國安會對決策環境的評估符合尼克森總統的想法，加上總統相當器重國家安全顧問季辛吉，甚至透過國家安全會議負責主導並執行對華政策。此一情況符合本文所建構之模式III（國家安全顧問在決策過程中較其他官員更受到總統的倚重，使國安會的功能以主導對華外交決策過程與產出為主）。

歸納艾森豪、甘迺迪及尼克森對國安會之運用方式，可區分為層級制及向心制。其中，總統與其國安顧問之關係，以及國安會之功能強弱，使國安會呈現不同的運作模式。因此，本論文的主旨可用以下這段文字表達：在美國對華外交決策過程中，國家安全會議因受到總統對國安顧問仰賴程度不一，以及國安會自身所發揮之功能強弱，導致其在決策過程中所能發揮之空間亦有所不同。

關鍵字

美國對華政策 ； 艾森豪時期 ； 甘迺迪時期 ； 尼克森時期 ； 國家安全會議 ； 決策理論

並列摘要

The U. S. National Security Council (NSC) has played different roles in the decision-making process of U.S. foreign policy toward China under the leadership of different presidents. As a result, the main purpose of this dissertation is to explore and interpret the roles of the NSC in the decision-making process of U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan in the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nixon administrations, thereby attempting to construct an analytical model for interpreting the related cases.

This author intends to construct the analytical model from the following two perspectives: one is the President’s dependence on the NSC adviser and the other the functions of the NSC. The decision-making theory, international system theory, and alliance theory will be synthesized to analyze the important cases in each administration, including the two Taiwan Strait Crises of the Eisenhower administration, the third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the UN representation problem of the Kennedy administration, and the UN representation and the Sino-U.S. normalization of the Nixon administration.

In the Eisenhower administration, the NSC’s evaluations of the decision environment were nothing different from President Eisenhower’s strategic thoughts during the two Taiwan Strait Crises. However, the president relied more on State Secretary John Foster Dulles than the Special Assistant of the National Security Affairs in the arena of foreign policy. As a result, the function of the NSC was confined to the coordination of interdepartmental different opinions only. Such a situation fits in with Model Ⅱ: The president doesn’t rely much on NSC adviser and the function of the NSC was limited to the coordination of interdepartmental disputes only.

During the third Taiwan Strait Crisis and UN representation problem in the Kennedy administration, the NSC evaluations of decision environment were different from President Kennedy’s way of thinking. Although JFK relied heavily on NSC adviser McGeorge Bundy, the NSC did little in the decision-making process of U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. Such a situation fits in with Model I: The president heavily relies on NSC adviser but the function of the NSC was mainly confined to the coordination of interdepartmental disputes.

In the Nixon administration, the NSC’s evaluations of the decision environment on the UN representation problem and the Sino-U.S. normalization policy accorded with President Nixon’s strategic thoughts. Moreover, the president closely cooperated with NSC adviser Henry A. Kissinger and let the NSC dominate the decision-making process of U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. Such a situation fits in with Model III : The president relies on NSC adviser more than any other officials and the function of the NSC was upgraded to dominate the decision-making process and the output of policies.

The manipulations of the NSC under the leadership of Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nixon could be divided into the hierarchical model and the collegial model. The different manipulations were based on the relationship between the president and NSC adviser and the functions of the NSC. To Sum up, the main theme of this dissertation is as follows: Different degree of the president’s reliance on the NSC adviser and different functions of the NSC will decide to what extent the NSC has the power and influence in the decision-making process of U.S. policy toward China.

並列關鍵字

U.S. China Policy ； Eisenhower Administration ； Kennedy Administration ； Nixon Administration ； National Security Council ； Decision-Making Theory

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