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  • 學位論文

活路外交下我國的國際空間

The ROC’s “ International Space ” under The Policy of Flexible Diplomacy

指導教授 : 蘇起

摘要


中華民國身為聯合國五大常任理事國和創始國,抗戰勝利後不過4年光景,國民政府失去了大陸江山,繼續在台灣地區行使政權,雖未能統治大陸地區,憑藉美國的支持,仍然在聯合國代表全中國長達22年之久,後因國際和我國內部因素,我們退出了聯合國。 中華民國退出了聯合國之後,國際孤立。1979年和美國斷交後,更出現斷交潮,蔣經國驚覺形勢比人強,連體育活動也開始和政治有關聯,在外交上開始出現妥協,「三不政策」鬆動。 蔣經國的繼任者李登輝,在爭取國家國際空間較蔣經國更為大膽和有彈性,憑藉著台灣當時雄厚的經濟實力,開始夾雜金援的務實外交(亦稱彈性外交)。2000年政黨輪替,陳水扁意外當選總統,沒有執政經驗,執政初期在兩岸關係上小心翼翼,後漸趨大膽,開始在國際上衝撞,被冠上「麻煩製造者」惡名。 2008年重新取得執政權的國民黨,總統馬英九在外交政策上一改陳水扁的烽火外交,主動向中共釋出善意,不再互挖邦交國,合理而受檢驗的金援受援助國,改善國人厭惡的金錢外交。對外關係和兩岸關係為一體之兩面,同等重要,兩岸關係和緩了,外交才有出路,即所謂「活路外交」。在中共選擇性的配合之下,台灣在國際空間有些許的突破,惟成效並不大,我國雖然參加了GPA等國際組織,和美、日等國的關係雖有進展,但是我國在國際組織中仍然遭到排擠,尤其是加入帶有主權意涵的國際組織更是不得其門而入。 中華民國在國際上要能生存、要有活路,其中很大部分來自中共的善意配合,中共擋在前面,要通過仍然是困難重重。不過我們要面對的,除了中共之外,朝野對於兩岸關係,是最需要取得共識的。

並列摘要


Barely four years after its hard-won victory over Japan, Republic of China (ROC) Government lost the Chinese mainland to the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. But it continued to govern Taiwan and exercise its rights in the UN system as one of its founding members and one of the permanent members of the Security Council. With the support of the US, the ROC represented the entire China in the UN for the duration of 22 years, even though the mainland remained beyond its jurisdiction. After the change of the international as well as domestic factors, ROC withdrew from the UN in 1971. The ROC fell into a long period of isolation after it left the UN. When the US decided to derecognize the ROC in 1979 and many other countries severed diplomatic ties with the ROC, then President Chiang Ching-kuo realized the tide was turned against Taiwan – even its participation in athletic competitions was no exception. So he sought to compromise on his steadfast “Three Nos” policy. His successor Lee Teng-hui was at once bolder and more flexible than Chiang Ching-kuo in his pursuit of greater international space. Taking advantage of Taiwan’s new found economic prowess, he began to adopt what he called “Pragmatic Diplomacy,” coupled with generous foreign aid to diplomatic allies. After Chen Shui-bian took over power in 2000, following a short period of caution, Chen embarked on a bold path, setting fire everywhere in the international arena, and earning for himself the title of “trouble-maker.” After ascension to the Presidency in 2008, Ma Ying-jeou abandoned Chen Shui-bian’s “Setting-Fire Diplomacy” completely. Instead, he sought to show goodwill to Mainland China by proposing to stop the long-standing practice of stealing diplomatic allies from each other. He dropped the “check-book diplomacy” - a long repugnant policy at home, and replaced it with continued, but reasonable and verifiable aid to ROC’s diplomatic allies. He believed that Taiwan’s foreign relations and cross-Taiwan Strait relations are two sides of the same coin. Only when the cross-strait relations thawed, could the country’s foreign relations expand. He dubbed this policy, “Huo-lu Wai-jiao” – a term still lacking a proper English translation. To the extent that Beijing went along with Ma’s initiatives, Taiwan managed to expand its international space somewhat, with notable limitations. Although Taiwan acceded to GPA, for instance, and improved its substantive relations with the US, Japan and some other countries, Taiwan remains outside most of the international organizations, especially those whose membership is based on sovereignty. For the ROC to survive internationally, it has to break out of its isolation. To do that, Mainland China’s goodwill is nearly essential. With Beijing blocking its path, the ROC would continue to face enormous difficulties. But other than the China factor, it also behooves the major parties inside Taiwan to reach consensus on this crucial issue.

參考文獻


翟思嘉,《陸委會與海基會互動關係研究》,私立淡江大學中國大陸研究所碩士論文,2014年。
歐鴻鍊,〈談「外交休兵」與「活路外交」〉,拉丁美洲經貿季刊,第4期,2011年,頁1-11。
謝淑麗著,溫洽溢譯,《脆弱的強權-在中國崛起的背後》(臺北市:遠流,2008 年)。
財團法人國家政策研究基金會 http://www.npf.org.tw/
李登輝,《台灣的主張》(臺北市:遠流,1999年)。

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