冷戰初期美國對蘇聯之政策: 從杜魯門到艾森豪

U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union at the Dawn of the Cold War: From Truman to Eisenhower

鄭函儒(Han-Ju Cheng)

指導教授 ： 黃介正

淡江大學/國際研究學院/美洲研究所碩士班/碩士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2012.00875

摘要

本篇論文試圖檢視冷戰時期從杜魯門總統至艾森豪總統的美國對蘇聯政策。自進核武時代起，美蘇便急欲取得優於對方之優勢，美國於杜魯門總統任內在1940年代後期開始建立其核武打擊力量，並且於1950年代艾森豪總統任內急速擴展其核武力量之規模。核武嚇阻為對蘇聯政策中重要環節，其用以應對蘇聯所引起的威脅，同時更是美蘇之間為生存進而競爭的主軸。

杜魯門與艾森豪政府對於核子武器運用之態度，皆深深受到核武嚇阻的影響。利用科學技術製造核武以作為嚇阻於冷戰時常被是為因應奇襲的防禦機制。然而軍事部份亦以此科技發展軍事力量，使美國得於強權間影響權力平衡之狀態。從政治上來看，美國將此核武優勢作為一個強而有力的政治商議籌碼，經濟上亦顯示其國家之經濟力量的象徵。嚇阻理論為主要運用分析理論，另外加入結構理論與體系理論配合嚇阻理論以分析杜魯門政府的圍堵政策。在分析艾森豪政府的新觀點政策時，亦加入攻勢理論與地緣論配合嚇阻理論以輔助分析其內容。

經過上述所有理論分析，嚇阻理論仍為是各運用之理論中最可接受且合乎運用，從圍堵政策到新觀點政策，美國形塑其行為模式去影響世界政治趨勢更往美國所希望的方向行進，同時美國更要以此方式藉由圍堵政策至新觀點政策的實現，以對抗蘇聯從各個如軍事、政治與經濟至意識型態，國家士氣與社會體制等等層次所引起對美國的挑戰。杜魯門政府與艾森豪政府之間最重要的相異點，便是取得國際事務與危機的主動權。隨著核武科技精進發展的同時，美蘇兩強無法結束冷戰的困境，便將此科技主要運用到軍事力量之上，再者世界危機也將美蘇推往瀕臨爆發戰爭衝突，也更深化雙方之間相互的不信任。美蘇間的困境因而轉變為無止盡的核武擴增發展。

關鍵字

杜魯門 ； 艾森豪 ； 圍堵政策 ； 嚇阻 ； 新觀點政策 ； 核子武器

並列摘要

This thesis looks to examine U.S. policies during the Cold War era towards the Soviet Union. In this case the timeframe exists from President Truman's administration through the Eisenhower administration. Since entering the age of nuclear weapons, both the United States and the Soviet Union were eager to gain an advantage over the other. The United States started to build its nuclear strike power in the late 1940’s, during Truman's administration, and it expanded in the 1950’s during Eisenhower's administration. Nuclear deterrence was an important policy used towards the threat posed by the Soviet Union. From Truman's Containment Policy to the New Look Policy of Eisenhower's administration, nuclear deterrence became the theme of these two nuclear great powers struggling for survival.

Nuclear deterrence greatly affected the attitude of both Truman and Eisenhower's administration towards the use of nuclear weapons. Using nuclear technology as a deterrent was always seen as a defense mechanism in the event of a surprise attack. Next, the military used this as a method for developing and as a counter-measure against a nuclear strike. From a political and economic viewpoint, this was considered a great bargaining chip and a sign of showing national economic strength. Deterrence theory will be the main theory used to analyze this thesis and, I also use Structuralism and System's Theory with Deterrence Theory to examine the Containment Policy of Truman's administration. Next, I use Offensive Realism and Geo-Strategy with reference to the Deterrence theory to analyze the New Look Policy of Eisenhower's administration.

After analyzing all the theories, Deterrence theory is still the most reasonable theory among the others used. From the Containment Policy to the New Look Policy, the United States formulated a pattern to influence world trends towards its preference. Simultaneously, it was also used against challenges presented by the Soviet Union in various levels of application including; military, politics, economy to ideology, as well as morale and social systems. The most important difference between Truman and Eisenhower's administration was to acquire the initiative of handling world affairs and crisis. With improving nuclear technology, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union could not end the Cold War dilemma by applying its military power. This world crisis also put the two powers on the brink of war, which also increased mutual distrust. This dilemma between the U.S. and the Soviet Union turned into an endless nuclear weapons build up.

並列關鍵字

Truman ； Eisenhower ； Containment Policy ； Deterrence ； The New Look Policy ； Nuclear Weapon

參考文獻

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