美國政府對台非軍事政策再議之決策過程 (1949 年1 月 21 日至1950 年6 月25 日)

The Decision-Making Process of Reappraising the U.S. Nonmilitary Policy toward Taiwan (from January 21,1949 to June 24, 1950)

盧博仁(Bo-Ren Lu)

指導教授 ： 陳一新

淡江大學/國際研究學院/美國研究所碩士班/碩士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2008.00713

摘要

1949 春天，美國面臨國民政府在內戰中的全面潰敗並苦思如何確保台灣不 落入中國共產黨的手?堙C因兵力不足，美國政府決定以非軍事手段，亦即以政治 和經濟方式，試圖挽救台灣。然而，此舉引發台灣戰略價值之內部爭論並延續到 韓戰爆發為止。 本論文試圖以艾里遜的三個模式(理性模式、組織模式、官僚模式)，以及從 理論探討抽理出來的三個假設，來探討美國政府對台非軍事政策再議之決策過 程。因此，本論文之目的就是從一九四九年一月二十一日艾奇遜出任國務卿到一 九五Ο 年六月二十四日韓戰爆發這段期間美國政府對台非軍事政策再議之決策 過程。從理性模式觀之，美國政府屬意離間策略以圍堵蘇聯勢力擴張並避免觸怒 中國共產黨之舉動，如出兵保台。因此，對台非軍事政策獲得採納並持續到韓戰 爆發。從組織模式觀之，國務院偏好離間策略並支配整個決策過程。因此，美國 政府對台非軍事政策得以屹立不搖且成功抵擋來自中國幫、國防部及遠東司之內 外挑戰，直到韓戰爆發為止。從官僚模式觀之，國務卿艾奇遜深信離間策略之可 行性，並和杜魯門總統維持密切的私人關係。因此，艾奇遜支配整個決策過程， 並擊敗如國防部長強森及遠東司長魯斯克等人對台非軍事政策之挑戰。 由此觀之，本論文之主旨就是，由於台灣的戰略價值沒有利用中國圍堵蘇聯 的離間策略來得重要，因此美國政府對台灣一直採取非軍事政策，藉著三個假設 之成功驗證，可知艾里遜的三個模式可以適用於本論文案例。

關鍵字

台美中關係

並列摘要

In the spring of 1949, the United States was encountered with the collapse of the
Chinese Nationalist government in the Civil War and pondered how to keep the
Chinese communists away from taking over Taiwan. Due to the disparity between the
strength and global obligations, the United States government decided to provide
Taiwan with political and economic assistances. However, the controversy over the
strategic value of Taiwan remained heated in the U.S. government until the outbreak
of the War in Korea.
The thesis applies Graham Allison’s three models, namely, rational actor model
(RAM), Organizational behavior model (OBM), and Governmental politics model
(GPM), to explore the decision-making process of reappraising U.S. nonmilitary
policy toward Taiwan. Three hypotheses are derived from the theoretical discussion.
Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to analyze the U.S. decision-making
process of reappraising the nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan from January 21, 1949,
when Dean Acheson assumed the post as Secretary of State, to June 24, 1950, when
the Korean War broke out. From the perspective of RAM, the U.S. government
favored the wedge strategy to contain the Soviet Union, thereby avoiding any move
enraging the Chinese communists. As a result, the U.S. nonmilitary policy toward
Taiwan was adopted until the outbreak of the Korean War. From the perspective of
OBM, the State Department was in favor of the wedge strategy and dominated the
decision-making process. Accordingly, the U.S. nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan
was adhered regardless of constant challenges from within and outside the State
Department, such as the China bloc, the Defense Department and the State
Department’s Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. From the perspective of GPM, Dean
Acheson, Secretary of State, was firmly convinced the value and likelihood of the
wedge strategy. And, most importantly, he maintained close relations with President
Harry S. Truman. Consequently, he dominated the decision-making process and
defeated all challenges of the U.S. nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan, particularly
from Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, and Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs.
Judging from the aforementioned analysis, the main theme of the thesis is that
the United Stated decided to adhere to the nonmilitary policy toward Taiwan until the
Korean War broke our because the strategic value of Taiwan was not as important as
that of the wedge strategy on Communist China. The successful testing of the three
hypotheses proves that Allison’s three models can be applicable in the case study of this thesis.

並列關鍵字

The wedge strategy ； The Chinese Titoism ； The offshore island defensive chain ； The China bloc ； U.S. policy toward Taiwan

參考文獻

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Kennan, George F. Memoirs, 1925-1950. Boston: An Atlantic Monthly Press Book, 1967.