兩岸互信機制：緣起與發展

Cross strait mutual trust mechanism: origins and development

許紹軒(Shao-Shuen Hsu)

指導教授 ： 林中斌

淡江大學/國際研究學院/國際事務與戰略研究所碩士在職專班/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2013.00877

摘要

一九四九年國共戰爭告一段落，形成海峽兩岸分治的現實，在超過半世紀的歲月中，兩岸多次爆發軍事衝突，造成重大人命死傷。如今隨著世界局勢的變動，兩岸逐步走向和解，但軍事上的敵對卻絲毫沒有鬆懈，究宛如不定時炸彈，時時刻刻威脅著區域的穩定。
信心建立措施的名詞與理論雖然發源自西方，但在中國歷史上卻不乏類似的實踐，本研究試圖透過中外信心建立措施的發展歷史與內涵，來研究兩岸發展信心建立措施或是讓南海太平島成為兩岸信心建立措施實驗區的可能性。
另外中共國家主席胡錦濤在2008年底所提出「軍事安全互信機制」，本研究也將此一新名詞的定義與內涵，與傳統信心建立措施相比較，以尋找兩者之間的相異處。
研究發現，在美中台架構下，台灣力量最小，也是最需要信心建立措施的一員，但受到國際政治權力架構的影響卻最大，對於這項議題總是身不由己。對中共來說，「軍事安全互信機制」的本質與傳統「信心建立措施」有不小差異，而「一中原則」與「台灣停止對美軍購」等兩大要件，更是中共對台「防獨促統」的重要手段。對美國而言，兩岸能減少誤判避免擦槍走火為當務之急，但兩岸過於親近或是敵對卻又不符合美國利益，兩岸應當持續對話，但若要討論軍事議題，事先應讓美方知悉。
至於南海的信心建立措施，研究發現複雜度遠高於海峽兩岸，所牽涉的不僅是美中台，更須顧慮其他南海主權聲索國的感受，難度更大。

關鍵字

軍事互信 ； 軍事安全互信 ； 兩岸關係

並列摘要

As the Chinese Civil War came to an end in 1949 and both sides of the Taiwan Strait were governed by separate administrations thereafter, several military conflicts still broke out between Taiwan and China and caused high death toll during the following half century. While both sides have begun to reconcile with each other with the changing world order, their military standoff continued as a ticking time bomb that threatens regional stability at all time.

The term and theory of the confidence-building measures (CBMs) originated from the West. However, the practice of this measure could be found in Chinese history. By reviewing the development and context of past confidence-building cases in Chinese and Western history, the study tried to examine the feasibility of developing a CBM between Taiwan and China as well as making the Taiping Island (Itu Aba) in the South China Sea a CBM experimental zone for Taipei and Beijing.
The study also attempted to make a comparison between the conventional CBMs and a new initiative of the “military security mutual trust mechanism,”which was advocated by former Chinese president Hu Jintao in 2008, and tried to identify the definition and context of the latter, which was a relatively new proposal.

The study found that Taiwan, as the weakest member in the trilateral framework between Taiwan, China and the US and the one needed the CBMs the most, often found that it was impacted too much by the international political structure that the issue was out of its control.

For Beijing, the study found, there are a lot of differences between its initiative of the“military security mutual trust mechanism”and the conventional CBMs. Additionally, the“one China principle”and ending of US arms sale to Taiwan came as the most important tools and strategy for China to“prevent Taiwan independence and promote unification.”

For the US, it favored persistent dialogues between both sides of the strait because the avoidance of Taipei and Beijing’s misjudgment of each other’s intention, which could inflict military conflicts, has been its top priority. However, Washington would like to be notified in advance if the dialogues touched upon the military issues as too much intimacy or hostility between the two sides does not serves its national interests.

The complexity of the establishment of a CBM in the South China Sea, the study found, would be much more higher than developing a CBM between Taiwan and China, with the process would inevitably involve the other claimants of the South China Sea.

並列關鍵字

CBMs ； cross strait

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