企業設置薪酬委員會對高階主管薪酬敏感度影響之研究

The Influence of Establishment of Compensation Committee on Executive Compensation Sensitivity

江志宏(Chih-Hung Chiang)

指導教授 ： 黃振豊

共同指導教授 ： 孔繁華

淡江大學/商管學院/會計學系碩士在職專班/碩士(2014年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2014.00924

摘要

如何強化公司治理機制受到全球高度的重視，有效的薪酬契約確能激勵高階主管對於企業的貢獻度，進而為股東創造財富。國外研究證明顯示，薪酬委員會制度的設置可強化高階主管薪酬的監督機制，並增加高階主管薪酬與經營績效間之敏感度。我國證券交易法遂於2010年11月增訂14條之6，規定公開發行公司應於2011年底前設置薪酬委員會，期藉由薪酬委員會設置來增強公司治理，其職責係檢視高階主管薪酬與經營績效表現之合理性，並制定妥適薪酬契約，以提升企業價值與極大化股東權益。
本研究探討企業薪酬委員會設置前後及薪酬委員會成員結構暨專業背景對高階主管薪酬與經營績效之影響，同時探討薪酬委員會成立後對於高階主管薪酬級距分布情形之變化。透過會計基礎績效指標(即資產報酬率變動率)及市場基礎績效指標(即相對股票報酬率)用以衡量高階主管經營績效。實證結果顯示，薪酬委員會的設置確有增加高階主管薪酬與經營績效敏感度之效果；在薪酬委員會成員組成方面，當獨立董事及外部專業人事擔任薪酬委員會比例愈高時，有增加高階主管薪酬與經營績效敏感度之功效，究其原因，應是獨立董事與外部專業人士任職條件及應取得專業資格相同，故使結果趨於一致；薪酬委員會成員組成至少有一位財會背景人士擔任其結果亦然，究其原因，高階主管之經營績效評估往往以財務數據衡量，並涉及會計估計原則所致。在高階主管薪酬級距變化方面，於薪酬委員會成立後，屬於高薪酬之高階主管比例有下降之趨勢，而低薪酬之高階主管比例則呈現上升之趨勢，究其原因，薪酬委員會係客觀審議高階主管薪酬，其用意係防止肥貓事件發生，此結果隱含著薪酬委員會成立後對於高階主管薪酬仍有某種程度上之影響。綜上所述，薪酬委員會的設置及成員組成背景，對於公司治理機制確有其助益，因而使高階主管薪酬與經營績效敏感度更加提升。

關鍵字

薪酬委員會 ； 高階主管薪酬 ； 經營績效 ； 公司治理 ； 代理理論

並列摘要

How to strengthen corporate governance mechanism has drawn much attention globally. Effective compensation contracts can indeed motivate the executives’ contribution to enterprises, thus creating wealth for shareholders. Foreign research shows that the setting up of a compensation committee system can enhance executive compensation supervisory mechanism and increase the sensitivity between executive compensation and business performance. The National Securities Exchange Act then amended Provision 6 of Article 14 in November 2010, asking public companies to set up a compensation committee before the end of 2011, in the hope of enhancing corporate governance and showing the benefits of executive compensation toward business performance, and develop an appropriate compensation contract in order to enhance corporate value and maximize shareholders’ equity. This study explored the effects of compensation committee establishment and the structure and professional background of the compensation committee members on executive compensation and business performance. It also discussed the impact of compensation committee establishment on executive compensation range distribution. Accounting-based performance indicators (ie, ∆ROA) and market-based performance indicators (ie the relative stock returns) were used to measure the executives’ business performance. The empirical results show that the setting up of a compensation committee has indeed increased executive compensation and business performance sensitivity. In terms of the member composition of the compensation committee, when the proportion of independent directors and external professionals’ serving in the compensation committee is higher, executive compensation and business performance sensitivity will be enhanced, which should be attributed to the similar working conditions and qualifications of independent directors and external professionals, hence the coherent results. There should be at least one person with accounting background serving in the compensation committee for the executives’ business performance assessment tends to be measured by financial data and involves accounting assessment principles. In terms of executive range changes in compensation, the proportion of executives with high compensation showed a decreasing trend after the compensation committee was established, while the proportion of executives with low compensation showed a rising trend, because the compensation committee reviewed the executive compensation objectively with the purpose of preventing having fat cats in the organization, which implies that the establishment of the compensation committee still has an impact on the executive compensation committee to some extent. In summary, the setting up of a compensation committee and its structure and members’ background are indeed constructive to corporate governance mechanism, thus enhancing executive compensation and business performance sensitivity.

並列關鍵字

compensation committee ； executive compensation ； business performance ； corporate governance ； agency theory

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