銀行治理機制、經營風險與其價值關聯性之研究

An Empirical Examination of the Relevance between Corporate Governance, Operation Risk, And Market Value

郭俊逸(Chun-Yi Kuo)

指導教授 ： 黃振豊

共同指導教授 ： 陳戰勝(Johnson Chen)

淡江大學/管理學院/會計學系碩士班/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2005.00709

摘要

台灣銀行業在經過亞洲金融風暴之後，銀行資產品質下降，逾期放款比率攀升，造成銀行獲利大幅衰退，甚至有金融機構面臨倒閉，引發金融危機。而公司監理機制之不完善，是導致亞洲金融危機的主要原因。文獻中指出，良好的公司治理能降低控制股東侵佔資產的動機。本文藉由銀行治理的評估了解那些治理機制會影響銀行經營風險及其價值。再探討經營風險與銀行價值的關係，研究主要以1999年至2003年台灣上市櫃13家金控公司子銀行及17家獨立銀行為研究對象透過分析，實證結論如下：

1、控制股東現金流量權越高，銀行經營風險越低，符合正的誘因效　果；另外當控制權偏離現金流量權的幅度越大時，控制股東對小　股東剝削的程度愈大，銀行經營風險越高，產生負的侵佔動機。　而導致偏離的主要原因即為運用金字塔結構、交叉持股及收購委　託書等策略，以較少資金投入卻擁有較高的投票權。
2、銀行董事會規模、關係人放款比例與經營風險呈正相關；然而存　在有次大股東則與經營風險呈負相關。
3、銀行存在有次大股東能有效提升市價淨值比。
4、銀行價值與自有資本適足率、調整後淨值呈正相關，而與逾期放　款比率呈負相關。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 資產品質 ； 逾期放款比率

並列摘要

After passing the Asian financial storm, Taiwan　banking has begun to show signs of the quality of banking assets deteriorating and the overdue lending ratio rising. Those signs caused the banking profitability to a great extent decrease, and even some of the financial institutions faced the threat of bankruptcy, and triggered the financial crisis. A not well-being corporate governance mechanism is a primary reason to cause the Asian financial crisis. According to the documentary, good corporate governance can lower the dominating shareholder’s incentive to seize the assets of a company. This text is from bank governance evaluation to understand what kind of governance mechanism affects the bank operation risk and its value. Furthermore, I’d like to discuss the relationship between the bank operation risk and the bank value from the main study during 1999 to 2003, including the thirteen public-listed and OTC-listed financial holding subsidiary banks and seventeen independent banks. The empirical result suggests：

1、The dominating shareholders have the more power in cash 　flow control, the lower the bank operation risk, which 　　is consistent with the positive incentive effect. In 　　　addition, when the dominating shareholders deviated with 　the control right in cash flow control, then more 　　　　exploitation happens in minority shareholders, banks get 　higher risk of operation, and a negative seized 　　　　　motivation will be created. The major reasons of the 　　　divergence are adapting the strategy such as using 　　　　pyramid’s structure, cross shareholding, and purchasing 　proxy…etc., which are investing the lower capital but 　　with owning the higher voting right.
2、The size of board at banks, and the lending ratio of 　　relative party have direct correlation with the bank 　　　operation risk; However, the banks hold the existing 　　　secondary major shareholders have negative correlation 　　with the operation risk.
3、The banks hold the existing secondary major 　　　　　　　shareholders can effectively promote P/B ratio.
4、The capital adequacy ratio of banks, and adjusted net 　　worth per share have positive correlation with the bank 　value; but the overdue lending ratio has negative 　　　　correlation with bank value.

並列關鍵字

Corporate governance ； Asset quality ； Overdue lending ratio

參考文獻

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