近十年許多企業發生財務舞弊事件,大多是經營者的金融倫理不佳引起。以博達案與安隆案為例,將財務報表進行窗飾行為,企圖將虧損的財務狀況將其掩飾,造成企業內部員工、投資人以及會計師事務所其財產與聲譽的損失。因此各國政府,制定較嚴謹的金融法規約束企業內部資訊揭露與確保會計人員獨立性。本研究將稅後淨利與營業收入淨額以班佛法則進行分析,並以中國及台灣為樣本驗證企業窗飾行為。利用班佛法則的位數法則之特性,偵測當金融法規制定後,是否能有效約束企業對於財務報表的操弄以及較高的審計品質是否能有效阻止投機性盈餘管理行為。本研究分析後發現當金融法規制定後,企業對於財報窗飾行為相較於制定前程度較低,表示法規之有效性;除此之外,四大會計師事務提出無保留意見書之財報數據的調整進位現象較非四大會計事務所低,表示四大會計師事務所審計品質較佳。本文結果可提供金融法規制定單位與會計師專業之管制單位重新思考法規與審計人員對財務報告資訊品質之貢獻。
Benford’s Law is a digital methodology. It been widely used to detect financial issues in recent 20 years. In this study, we detect enterprises behavior of window dressing, and evaluate recent finance regulation such as U.S. “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act “to prevent financial fraud of enterprises and enhance firms’ internal control. Besides strict regulations imposed for auditors to make auditing opinions. Moreover, we separate listed companies’ auditing opinion by big 4/non-big 4 CPA firms. The results show that audit opinion expressed by non-big 4 CPA firms would occur more earning management than others. This study, with Benford’s law, examines the net income, operating revenue of Taiwan and Shenzhen, China. We certify strict finance regulation and auditing opinion of big 4 CPA firms that restrain listed companies window dressing behavior. The conclusions are: first, stricter finance regulation make companies prevent from window dressing behavior more efficiently and could futher enhance CPA’s auditing ability. Besides Big 4 CPA firms perform better auditing quality especially in first and forth digit financial statements. By utilizing Benford’s law, we conclude that digit analysis can further assist auditors to enhance financial statement accuracy and reduce inventor’s and stakeholder’s risk.