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  • 學位論文

實質盈餘管理、盈餘門檻與資訊透明度關係之研究

The Relation of Real Earning Management, Earnings Thresholds and Information Transparency

指導教授 : 林鳳儀
共同指導教授 : 吳忠敏(Chung-Min Wu)

摘要


本研究主要檢測台灣上市(櫃)企業實質盈餘管理、盈餘門檻與資訊透明度之關係。以往研究認為投資大眾會因為企業財務報表公佈之盈餘不如預期,而給予負向評價,因此,管理當局可能會透過盈餘管理之行為以避免公告盈餘低於盈餘門檻。近年來有越來越多證據顯示操縱應計項目並非盈餘管理的主要方式。 因此,本研究不同過往的研究,採用實質盈餘管理為檢測方式,並選定正盈餘門檻、前期盈餘門檻及分析師盈餘門檻做為研究主軸;過去有關實質盈餘管理之研究,大都探討向上盈餘管理,較少探討向下及平穩化盈餘管理的行為,因此本研究欲檢驗是否企業存在以符合盈餘門檻動機而進行之盈餘行為,並期望找出台灣企業對於五種實質盈餘管理項目(營運活動現金流量、研發支出、銷管費用、處分資產利得及生產成本)之主要操作工具。而研究結果亦發現獲利狀況不同的公司群組,管理者的確會於其在意的盈餘門檻有實質盈餘管理行為。 自2002年恩隆(Enron)案爆發後,與公司治理與資訊揭露相關的議題備受重視,較佳的資訊透明度可有效減少管理者進行盈餘管理的行為,但鮮有同時探討實質盈餘管理、盈餘門檻與資訊透明度三者間關係之研究。本研究進一步藉由企業實質盈餘管理行為的情況,進行檢測三種盈餘管理動機與資訊透明度的調節效果,研究結果證實了資訊透明度確實會影響實質盈餘管理行為。

並列摘要


This study examines the relationship among the real earnings management, earnings thresholds, information transparency and environmental information disclosure from the Taiwan listed companies. Previous researches show that the investors tend to have negative evaluations to those companies whose financial statements fail to meet the earnings target. Therefore, managers prefer to manipulate their earnings to avoid being less than the earnings thresholds. Recently, more and more literatures show that dressing the accruals is not the main approach for earnings management . We focus on zero, last period earnings, and consensus analyst forecasts as proxies of earnings thresholds. Moreover, the earnings management was divided into three portions including the upward, downward and smooth earnings management. Most literatures mainly focus on upward earnings management. The behavior of downward and smooth earnings management need more exploitation. For this reason, our study likes to examine whether the companies behave to operate the earnings for meeting the motivation of earnings thresholds. We anticipate finding the principal operating instrument out of five real earnings management for Taiwan enterprises. Lots of literatures show that firms with better corporate governance mechanisms can effectively reduce earnings management behavior. Instead, studies about the correlation among real earnings management, earnings thresholds and information transparency need more efforts. Therefore, our research attempts to examine the corporate governance factors related to earnings management to understand the characteristics of a firm’s earnings thresholds and earnings management behavior. We examine the correlation among the real earnings management, three earnings thresholds and three earnings management motivations through the enterprise information disclosure transparency.

參考文獻


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