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  • 學位論文

運用位數分析探討台灣與美國股市美化盈餘管理行為-機構投資人之角色

Applying digit analysis to investigate the cosmetic earnings management behavior on Taiwan and United States stock markets: the role of institutional investors

指導教授 : 林鳳儀

摘要


本研究針對台灣與美國股票市場進行分析,探討在不同發展程度市場中機構投資人持股高低在影響企業美化盈餘管理的行為中所扮演之角色,運用班佛法則,分析2001至2013年台灣45,041筆、美國62,734筆正稅後淨利數據,研究發現無論成熟市場或是新興市場,企業管理者從事美化盈餘管理的行為均存在,台灣與美國股票市場每季均呈現顯著偏離的情形,但美國與台灣有明顯的不同,台灣企業以第四季偏離最為嚴重,而美國企業第四季偏離程度反而減少。 此外,本研究探討不同多空走勢市場、不同企業規模、不同公司控制型態、不同股權結構與不同經營績效下,機構投資人持股高低對企業美化盈餘管理行為的影響。研究發現機構投資人在不同股票市場上扮演角色可能有所差異,對成熟市場而言(如美國),機構投資人對美化盈餘管理行為具有一定避免或減少管理者操弄盈餘數據之效果,相對而言,機構投資人在新興市場(如台灣)扮演的角色則不太一致。本研究進一步探討外資持股比例對於台灣企業美化盈餘管理之影響,發現外資法人對管理者之盈餘管理行為較具有抑制效果,顯示在台灣股市的機構投資人中,外資法人擔任企業外部監督的一個重要角色。研究結果可有助於強化盈餘管理與機構投資人相關文獻之實證證據,並可做為有關部門未來制定相關規範之參考。

並列摘要


This study investigates the role of institutional investors on cosmetic earnings management on Taiwan and United States stock markets respectively. Using Benford's Law, the analysis employs 45,041 and 62,734 positive earnings observations for all publicly listed US and Taiwan companies from 2001 to 2013, respectively. The empirical results show that, regardless of Taiwan and United States stock markets, the phenomenon of cosmetic earnings management exits. Moreover, this study investigates the role of institutional investors on cosmetic earnings management on bull market or bear market, scale enterprises, control types, ownership structure and operating performance. This result demonstrates that U.S. institutional investors play an important role in reducing the cosmetic earnings management behavior. However, the role of Taiwan's institutional investors is not consistent. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of foreign ownership on cosmetic earnings management on Taiwan stock markets. Finding that foreign ownership have an inhibitory effect on earnings management. The results strengthen the empirical evidence of cosmetic earnings management and institutional investors. The results can be used as a reference for investors and regulatory agencies.

參考文獻


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