會計穩健性、法人持股與盈餘管理間之關聯性

The Relationship between Accounting Conservatism, Institutional Shareholdings and Earnings Management

鄭淇文(Jheng Chi-Wun)

指導教授 ： 林鳳儀

國立臺北科技大學/管理學院/經營管理系碩士班/碩士(2013年)

摘要

會計穩健原則又稱謹慎性，管理者應謹慎評估及反應企業經營環境面臨之不確定性及風險，在編製財務報表之過程中採用較不樂觀之會計估計，Basu(1997)主張會計穩健性是指「相較於認列壞消息，管理者會傾向於需要更高的驗證程度認列好消息」，故會計穩健性可提供管理者公允表達企業財務狀況與經營成果之指引。此外，機構法人被視為外部監督機制，相對於一般投資大眾而言，機構法人持有之股份較多，且具有較充足之資源與知識，在自身利益保護之動機驅使下，較有誘因去監督標的公司之盈餘管理行為。由於過去學者對於會計穩健性與機構法人持股對盈餘管理影響之看法不盡相同，且尚未有採用班佛法探討其關聯性之研究，因此本研究透過觀察實際盈餘數字分布情形，檢測在不同穩健性程度與機構法人持股下，企業財務報表所揭露之盈餘數字是否有偏離班佛法則之情形，探討會計穩健性與機構法人持股對盈餘管理之影響。實證結果顯示會計穩健性較低與機構投資人持股率較低之公司有較高之盈餘管理動機，在會計穩健原則與機構投資人之監督下可限制管理者之盈餘操弄行為。對於高穩健性之公司而言，財務報表編製者以較保守之方式編製財務報表之情形下，機構投資人持股比率高反而會提高公司盈餘管理程度。本研究結果能夠補足文獻缺口，且可提供給社會大眾做為投資決策之指引，並作為監理單位改善企業公司治理之參考依據。

關鍵字

會計穩健性 ； 機構法人 ； 盈餘管理 ； 班佛法則

並列摘要

Accounting conservatism usually is a factor which influence firms’ when manager reports financial report. Basu(1997) defined accounting conservatism as higher verification in recognizing good news than bad news or losses. Prior scholars indicated that corporate can adopt accounting conservatism to decrease earnings manipulation but some scholars believed that firms would have more incentive to increase earnings manipulation. In addition, institutional investor found to play external monitoring mechanism and institutional investors’ shareholdings would affect the earnings manipulation. Accruals have adopted as a proxy of earnings manipulation to detect the relationship among accounting conservatism, institutional investor shareholdings and earnings manipulation. This study further investigates the relationship among accounting conservatism, institutional investor shareholdings and earnings manipulation by using Benford’s law. Accounting conservatism facilitates the monitoring of managers accounting selection, potentially limiting the opportunities for earnings management. We expect that firms adopt a high degree of conservatism can effective decrease earnings management. Our results indicate that firms with more conservative financial reporting have less probabilities of having engaged in earnings manipulative activities to achieve reference points. We also find that the incentives to earnings management are including the negative association between earnings management and institutional investor shareholdings.The other findings include earnings management are negatively associated with the shareholdings of institutional investors. However, if companies’ financial statements tend to be conservatism, institutional investors’ shareholding could increase managers’ incentive to manage earnings. The findings of the study have important implications for investors in making invest decisions.

並列關鍵字

Accounting conservatism ； Institutional shareholding ； earnings

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