本論文分析微軟如何從個人電腦市場跨足到資訊設備的策略:微軟藉由作業系統與軟、硬體合作廠商共同制定產業標準,與市場主導者競爭。本論文分析的範疇包括個人數位助理、家庭遊戲機、與智慧型手機。本論文旨在分析微軟與競爭的作業系統商,如何利用相容與否的策略,增加市場佔有率。本論文以靜態賽局模型,求取微軟及競爭作業系統商,採取相容與否及跨業整合與否策略的奈許均衡解。 研究發現,微軟的主導性策略,為採取與對手合作廠商相容的策略,以取得對手合作廠商的研發資源與顧客群,且微軟會以.NET的策略,發展跨三個市場的平台,以增加整合的效益。與微軟競爭的三家作業系統商,會採不相容的策略,以限制微軟取得合作廠商的資源,且三個廠商只有在轉換成本小於微軟.NET的整合效益下,才會選擇整合成一家公司。在研究假設的限制下,市場先行者的網路效益大於微軟.NET的整合效益加上相容策略的效益,故三家作業系統商的市場佔有率較微軟大。
Microsoft has recently been involed in the markets of personal information equipmen. This thesis aims to analyze how Microsoft utilizes its operating system to make the industrial standard with hardware and software allies in these brand new markets. The scope of the markets defined in this thesis is personal digital assistant (PDA), console game player, and smartphone. Using, the game theoretic model, this study focuses on the compatibility strategies Microsoft and its counterparts adopt to maximize their respective market share, and solves the Nash Equilibrium under the condition that whether or not Microsoft and its competitors adopt the compatibility and the cross-market integration strategies . The model found out that Microsoft’s dominant strategy is to be compatible, in order to get the opponents’ resources and customers. Microsoft would also adopt .NET strategy to gain the integration effects. Meanwhile, the three competitors would adopt the incompatible strategy to avoid Microsoft’s take-oever of their network effects.. They would also form an alliance, if and only if, the switching cost is lower than the integration effect, Provided the assumptions made in this thesis are held, the network effects of first mover would be greater than the the integration effects of .NET strategy plus the compatiblity effects, which results a larger market share of the three competitors than that of Microsoft.
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