代工業共同接單模式之探討

代工製造使台灣在全球高科技產業分工體系中佔有一席之地，但國內代工製造業長期受到國際買主之「下單、換廠」策略佈局影響：大量擴充廠房及機器設備致使產能過剩，形成完全買方市場，只能任由買方控制價格，而毫無議價籌碼。為避免這種現象持續發生，本論文提出「同業間成立策略聯盟，以單一窗口對外接單，再將訂單分配予聯盟成員」之運作模式。希望藉由聯合國內該產業主要業者合作，採用集中接單的方式，避免惡性低價競爭，增加與國際買主議價籌碼，進而提昇該產業在國際上的競爭力。因此，如何在這種運作架構下，提出合理、可行的訂單與利潤分配模式，實乃重要相關議題之一。　　　　本研究係針對已成立之同業策略聯盟，且其成員可生產多種已知產品，在透過單一窗口方式接得訂單後，提出訂單與利潤分配予各成員之建議。訂單分配模式主要依據各成員過去績效表現，決定未來一年應分得之營業額比率；再根據實際接單時各成員的產品價格、可用產能、產品品質等條件，決定訂單之分配。分配過程除了追求聯盟最大利潤，並儘可能達成訂單分配公平。此外，為追求分配機制的公平性，避免訂單分配結果未達原先承諾比率，造成成員損失：本研究於利潤分配階段，考量各成員本年績效表現、對聯盟利潤貢獻度、及接單率與既定分配公平性目標值之偏離率，決定各成員應得之回饋利潤。最後透過範例計算與分析，說明此共同接單模式在多種情況下，分配結果之合理性，及所能達成之效益。期望提出之運作模式，能為長久難以有效實現之同業策略聯盟機制提出可行運作之建議方案。

關鍵字

訂單分配；共同接單；公平性；績效評估；利潤分配

並列摘要

Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) has placed Taiwan as a key role of global high-tech industry. However, our manufacturers were trapped in a game manipulated by international buyers’ strategic deployments for a long time. The buyers usually order a large amount of goods to a manufacturer this time, then turn to others when they have new requests. A phenomenon resulting from this gaming operation is excessively idle capacity facing most manufacturers, and consequently they have no power to bargain with the buyers. To mitigate this kind of disadvantageous situation, we propose that manufacturers should adopt a way of forming strategic alliance to play against the buyers’ manipulation. To members of the alliance, there is only single point-of-contact in handling orders from buyers. It is clear that how to fairly and reasonably allocate orders and profits will be important issues when forming a strategic alliance. 　　　　In this research, we focus on how to fairly allocate orders for an existing strategic alliance whose members can produce certain kinds of goods. Upon receiving a purchase request, the alliance will check whether this order can be promised, and determine how to split the order to each member. Based on each member’s past performance and expected growth rate, we first compute the percentage of the total amount of orders to be allocated to each member next year. Next, under constraints such as each member’s product price, quality and total capacity, etc., we tend to allocate the orders in pursuit of maximizing total profits and achieving the allocation equity. Furthermore, we are in an attempt to achieve the allocation equity reasonably through profit sharing; we take each member’s performance, profit contribution rate, and the difference rate between the promised and real allocated ratio this year into account in this stage. Finally, we illustrate the merits of our model through examples in consideration of different ordering situations.

並列關鍵字

Order Allocation ； Single Point-of-Contact ； Equity ； Performance Evaluation ； Profit Sharing

參考文獻

[1] Adams, J. S., “Inequity in social exchange,” in L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 2, Academic Press, New York, 267-299, 1965.

[2] Barbarosoglu, G., and Yazgac, T., “An application of the analytic hierarchy process to the supplier selection problem,” Production and Inventory Management Journal, 38, 14-21, 1997.

[3] Caddick, J. R., and Dale, B.G., “The determination of purchasing objectives and strategies: some key influences,” International Journal of Physical Distribution and Materials Management, 17, 5-16, 1987.

[5] Cho, C. J., “An equity-efficiency trade-off model for the optimum location of medical care facilities,” Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 32, 99-112, 1998.

[6] Cooper, W. W., Seiford, L. M., and Tone, K., Data Envelopment Analysis: A Comprehensive Text with Models, Applications, References, and DEA-Solver Software, Kluwer Academic, Massachusetts, 2000.

國際替代計量

代工業共同接單模式之探討

主題瀏覽