委託書爭奪之相關研究

TWO ESSAYS ON PROXY CONTESTS

姜佳瑗(Chia-Yuan Jiang)

指導教授 ： 沈仰斌

元智大學/管理學院/管理研究所/博士(2009年)

摘要

第一個研究主題：
重新檢驗委託書爭奪中剩餘現金的代理問題
Faleye (2004)指出，委託書爭奪前現金多的目標公司，在委託書爭奪後現金有顯著下降，因此，他認為透過委託書爭奪，可解決公司多餘現金的代理問題。Brailaford and Yeoh (2004)提到，公司有多餘的現金且較少的投資機會，才會發生代理問題，因此現金多寡不是代理問題的充分條件。Opler et al. (1999)實證結果證明，公司的現金存量有回歸到平均值的現象，避免公司持有過多或過少的現金，而發生代理問題。因此，本研究重新檢驗委託書爭奪後現金的改變，我們發現， Faleye (2004)的部分實證結果，為現金調整回歸到平均值的現象，而非委託書爭奪的影響；我們考量公司的投資機會和控制現金回歸平均值的現象後，結果指出，現金多且投資機會少的公司在委託書爭奪後，才真正有現金下降的現象，可見委託書爭奪確實可解決多餘現金的代理問題。此外，現金多且投資機會少的目標公司，其委託書爭奪的宣告報酬確實顯著高於其他目標公司，可見市場投資人也樂觀看到這些有代理問題的公司，發生委託書爭奪。

第二個研究主題：
公司治理與委託書爭奪
Microsoft併購Yahoo的個案，讓我們聯想到，公司的內部治理機制及反併購條款的多寡，應該會影響目標公司面對併購案時的態度，進而影響之後發生委託書的機率。因此本研究探討，併購目標公司的內部公司治理及反併購條款的多寡，對事後發生委託書爭奪機率的影響程度。我們發現，內部公司治理較差(以董事會人數多寡、大股東持股比例、機構投資人持股比例、內部人持股比例及執行長持股比例來衡量)或者有較多反併購條款的目標公司，較容易拒絕或阻礙併購活動，因此使發生委託書爭奪的機率上升；投資機會少的目標公司，代理問題應該比較嚴重，發生委託書爭奪的機率也較高；此外，若目標公司處於高度競爭的產業，經理人做任何決定應該會比較謹慎，因此較不會拒絕對股東或公司有利的併購案，發生委託書爭奪的機率較低；最後，過去研究指出，多角化的併購案，常常存在代理問題，因此，目標公司面對多角化的併購案，為了公司利益著想，應該會傾向拒絕，主併公司則可能會發動委託書爭奪，來達到其目的。

關鍵字

委託書爭奪, 投資機會, 剩餘現金流量 ； 委託書爭奪, 反併購條款, 內部公司治理

並列摘要

The First Essay:
Reexamine the Agency Problem of Free Cash Flow in Proxy Contests
Faleye (2004) suggests that proxy contests could address the agency problem of excess cash. He shows that there are significant differences in unadjusted cash changes surrounding the proxy contests between firms with positive excess cash and negative excess cash. Brailaford and Yeoh (2004) indicate that cash-rich firm in a low growth environment is also a necessary condition for free cash flow to be present. Opler et al. (1999) suggests that cash balance of firms exist mean reversion phenomenon. On the basis of the evidences above, our study reexamines the agency problem of free cash flow in proxy contests. We find that the results of cash decreases following proxy contests in Faleye (2004) could attribute to cash balance mean reverting phenomenon. We observe that decreases in cash following proxy contest for contest firms with positive excess cash and low q ratio. In other words, proxy contests could mitigate the agency problem of free cash flow. Moreover, contest firms with free cash flow experience the largest market reaction to the proxy fight announcement.

The Second Essay:
Corporate Governance and Proxy Contests
The Microsoft/Yahoo story raises questions that whether the external corporate governance mechanism or internal corporate governance mechanisms of takeover targets have material impact on the manager’s response to a takeover bid which might result in a proxy fight subsequently. We examine the impact of antitakeover provisions and internal corporate governance mechanisms on the probability of a proxy fight following a takeover attempt. We find that firms with more antitakeover provisions or weak internal corporate governance are likely to impede the takeover bids and easily become proxy fight targets within one year following takeover announcement. In addition, firms with poor investment prospects are likely to induce agency problems. The evidences reveal that firms with low growth opportunities are likely to be the target of proxy contests. Moreover, we show that the firm in a competitive industry would not easily reject a takeover bid that is beneficial to firm value and the probability of a proxy fight subsequently would lower. Finally, takeover target is likely to reject a diversifying takeover attempt, and the acquirer has a higher likelihood to raise a proxy contest afterwards.

並列關鍵字

Proxy contests, Free cash flow, Investment opportunities ； Antitakeover provisions (ATPs), proxy contests, internal corporate governance

參考文獻

Lie, E., 2005, Operating performance following open market share repurchase announcements, Journal of Accounting Economics 39, 411-436.

The First Essay:

Reexamine the Agency Problem of Free Cash Flow in Proxy Contests

Ang, J.S., R.A. Cole, and J.W. Lin, 2000, Agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Finance 55, 81-106.

Barber, B.M. and J.D. Lyon, 1996, Detecting abnormal operating performance: the empirical power and specification of test-statistics, Journal of Financial Economics 41, 359-399.