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  • 學位論文

公司治理與代理成本問題之研究

Research on the Issues of Corporate Governance and Agency Costs.

指導教授 : 羅進水

摘要


摘要 現代企業經營是採行經營權與所有權分離原則,然亦因為如此,所有權人與經營者間產生代理成本。本文探討可否藉由公司治理制度緩和代理問題。本文研究結果顯示,控制股東股東的控制權與現金流量權差異程度越大,淨值或營業資產的報酬率愈差代理成本愈高。設獨立董監事可增加公司績效,降低代理成本。公司董事長兼總經理會增加公司的營業費用,不利於公司經營績效,代理成本增加。獨立董監事的設置未能顯著抑制公司的費用。不同於法人效率監督假說,本文研究顯示,外資法人持股較高的公司,經營績效不佳,外資法人似乎未盡監督之效。

並列摘要


Abstract The current managing concept for enterprises is based on the separation principle of managerial authority and ownership, and for this reason, agency costs will result between the proprietor and the businessman. This article probes whether the agency issue may be mitigated through the company’s managing system. The research outcome of this article indicates that the greater the difference between the control power over shareholders and cash flow, the worse the net worth or the rate of return for the operating assets, and therefore the higher the agency costs. Establishing independent supervisors may increase the company’s performance and reduce the agency costs. A president of a company who is also the general manager will increase the operating expenses of the company, which is unfavorable for the company’s managing performance, and will increase the agency costs. The establishment of independent supervisors does not noticeably suppress the company’s expenses. Differing with the efficient monitoring hypothesis for corporations, this research indicates that companies with a higher share of foreign institutional investors have worse performance, showing that foreign institutional investors seem to have not done their best in terms of supervision.

參考文獻


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被引用紀錄


顏嘉珍(2012)。從組織學及二次翻瓣的角度探討動物和人類以牙周組織引導再生術治療骨內缺損的效果: 系統性回顧和整合分析方法〔碩士論文,臺北醫學大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6831/TMU.2012.00049

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