在本文中我們檢驗2002年至2010年間台灣上市企業績效與(1)董事持股(2)董事家族持股(3)獨立董事席次比率之關係,在資料中專注於個人董事及其家族持股並排除法人董事之持股;在控制內生性與企業獨特因素後,研究發現CEO董事個人持股與企業績效呈現正向關係,結果支持代理理論中誘因效果關於CEO具誘因強化企業與其個人利益之推論。本文亦發現經理人董事之家族持股與企業績效間之正向關係,顯示當家族利益相關時,Villalonga and Amit (2006)所推論之大/小股東之間的代理問題可能得以緩解。此外本文發現獨立董事席次比率與企業績效間之正向關係,顯示獨立董事對企業的監督有益於企業績效。最後,本文分別以2002年至2006年與2007年至2010年的子樣本進行檢驗,比較法規強制規定上市公司聘任獨立董事後,研究結果發現在2006年至2010年間經理人持股對ROA、ROE有正向影響,在獨立董事席次比上2006年至2010年對公司績效也有顯著正相關代表增設獨立董事對公司經營上有好處,在CEO家族持股方面對公司影響則呈現負相關。
In this essay, we examine if there are significant associations between firm performance and (1) directors’ shareholdings, (2) directors’ family shareholdings, and (3) independent directors’ seats on board among Taiwanese publicly listed firms between 2002 and 2010. After addressing for possible endogeneity and controlling for firm specific variables, we find a positive association between CEO’s shareholding and firm performance measured by ROA. Consistent with agency theory and incentive effect, this result indicates that CEOs have control over firms’ operation and have incentive to maximize firms’ value. Also, we find that the non-executive directors’ family shareholding is positively related to firm performance, which implies that non-executive directors may be motivated by their family members to improve firm value. The results also imply that the majority-minority agency problem (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) can be reduced when director’s family welfare is at stake. In addition, we find a positive association between independent director’s seats on board and firm performance, which implies that independent directors are likely to improve firm performance through monitoring. Lastly, we divide the sample into 2002-06 and 2007-10 subsets to examine if different results are found due to the mandated independent directors on board by regulation since 2007.