The purpose of this research is to study the influence of the interactive effect between manager characters and cash holdings on Firms’ Value. In addition, we use marginal pricing model suggested by Tong (2011) as a research method to analyze the cash holdings, we take the Managers Ownership, Managerial Remuneration and CEO Duality as proxy variables to evaluate the manager characters. The empirical finding shows that Managers Ownership and Cash Holdings on the Firms’ Value have a negative correlation and easily result in the anti-takeover behavior when the company managers hold higher shares, so that the company's managers will lower the degree of acceptance to their companies, and furthermore reduce the Firms’ Value. The synergistic effect between CEO Duality and Cash Holdings performs positive correlation on the corporate value, this might imply that it will lower internal information asymmetry and raise the Firm’s Value when the corporate president serves as general manager at the same time.