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  • 學位論文

資訊揭露、股權結構與企業價值關係之研究

The Relationship Among Information Disclosure、Ownership Structure and Firms Value

指導教授 : 呂麒麟
共同指導教授 : 黃志祥(Chi-Hsiang Huang)

摘要


根據國內外組織對公司治理的定義與目的,以及對資訊透明的要求,顯示出在股權結構、企業價值與資訊揭露間可能有關係存在。首先Ross(1977)依據訊號理論發現資訊揭露會影響企業股價表現;爾後Verrecchia(1990)發現自願性的資訊揭露會使投資人持股意願增加,以及股權結構與企業價值的諸多爭論,本研究認為資訊揭露、股權結構與企業價值三者之間的交叉關係不應侷限於探討部分的關聯,應該以更全面的角度衡量三者關係。本文考慮三者可能存有交互關係,遂以內部人持股比例衡量股權結構變數與Tobin’s Q衡量企業價值變數;最後設立聯立實證模型,並根據Greene(2003)的研究結論以較具漸進效果的三階段最小平方法探討其關係。 由實證結果發現資訊揭露與內部人持股比例存有顯著的正向關係,顯示出內部人持股比例較集中時會有較佳的資訊揭露表現,同時資訊揭露與企業價值也存有顯著正向關係,本文發現較佳的資訊揭露表現會使企業價值表現愈好,而較佳的企業價值表現也會鼓勵企業揭露更多的資訊。最後在內部人持股比例與企業價值則是顯著的負向關係。本研究認為因為較集中的內部人持股比例可能發生的自利行為會有損投資人利益,當投資人缺乏相關監督機制時會因為內部人持股比例集中而失去投資信心。但是內部人經由掌握較高的企業決策權,經由主動揭露更多企業資訊給市場投資人時,會鼓勵與增加投資人信心而有助於提升企業價值,當企業價值表現較佳時也會有較高的動機驅使內部人持續提供更多企業資訊與投資人。

並列摘要


According to definition and purpose which the domestic and international organization manage to the company, and to the transparent demand of information, demonstrate that there may relations that exist among Ownership Structure, Firms Value and Information Disclosure. Ross (1977)According to the Signal theory find the Information Disclosure will influence stock price; Verrecchia (1990)Find voluntary Information Disclosure will make investors hold share the will increase, and Ownership Structure disputes with a great deal of Firms Value, this research is thought Information Disclosure, the relation of crossing between Ownership Structure and Firms Value three should not be confined to probing into some relation, should weigh the relation between three with more overall angle. We conside the relations in them, then let Internal Shareholder displace Ownership Structure and Tobin' s Q displace Firms Value; According to Greene (2003) we set up the unite model finally, Research conclusion probe into their relations of in three stage least squares method of result in order to advancing gradually than having. WE find the relation between Information Disclosure and Internal Shareholder, When we had better Information Disclosure the Internal Shareholder is more centralized, at the same time Information Disclosure and Firms Value are apparent to the relation, It will make Firms Value do well that better Information Disclosure displays, and better Firms Value is it can encourage enterprises reveal more message too to display. It is apparent defeats to the relation in Internal Shareholder and Firms Value. Because Internal Shareholder that concentrate on relatively might take place favourable behavior will diminish investor interests since, will lose investment confidence because Internal Shareholder is centralized when investors lack relevant supervision mechanism. But via grasp higher enterprise policy-making power, via reveal more enterprise information give market at the investor voluntarily inside people, will encourage and increase investor's confidence and contribute to improving Firms Value, have a higher motive that will drive inside people to offer information and investor to more enterprises continuously too when it is better to behave in Firms Value.

參考文獻


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