多層級組織下責任會計之分析性研究

An Analytical Study of Responsibility Accounting in a Hierarchical Structure

王貞靜(Chen-Chin Wang)

指導教授 ： 戚務君 ； 簡俱揚

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2003年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200300237

摘要

sdfg有別於典型的分析性管理會計研究，僅針對單一層級與單一績效指標探討代理問題，本研究建構多層級組織之動態規劃。
三位賽局參與者的主要經濟決策為： 第一，業主的工作在於（1）如何權衡該企業之責任中心（responsibility center）設計；以及如何在不同責任中心下，為經理人擬定最適的獎酬計畫。第二，經理人的職掌則為 (1) 規劃產量水準，(2) 影響生產效率的努力水準，以及 (3) 如何提供其員工最適生產努力之薪資誘因。最後，員工則決定影響實際生產產出之努力水準高低。
研究發現：產出不確定性愈高或是兩位代理人之風險厭惡係數愈大，業主應採取不同績效指標從事經理人之誘因機制設計－就本文而言，即應採取雙重績效指標作為經理人最適薪酬契約設計；反之，產出不確定性愈低或是兩位代理人之風險厭惡係數愈小，則業主採取單一績效指標與雙重績效指標設計則無太大差異。而且，此三項關鍵因素亦同時影響經理人規劃產能水準、員工最適薪資計畫誘因強度以及員工投入努力水準之高低。

關鍵字

誘因機制 ； 多層級組織 ； 責任會計 ； 代理問題

並列摘要

This study analyzes a hierarchical structure, comparing to typical analytical literature of management accounting, which is structured on single layer. Basically the hierarchical structure is composed of three main game players, Owner, Manager and Worker, and the economic behaviors of their decision-making are as follow, (1) Owner, the principal, is in charge of the design of firm’s responsibility center, and the best compensation plan of manager’s incentive mechanism based on different responsibility centers. (2) Manager, one of the agents, is responsible for capacity planning and incentive programming to make his worker pursue optimal throughputs spontaneously, and decides how much effort he needs to contribute to production efficiency improving. (3) Worker, the other agent, decides how much effort he would like to input.
Through this model simulation concludes that：First, the owner should use dual performance index to develop incentive mechanism for his manager, when the uncertainty of throughput is going up or the risk-averse coefficient of agents, manager and worker, grows especially. Second, there will be no significant difference frousing dual or single performance index when the uncertainty of throughput is going down or the risk-averse coefficient of agents decreases. Finally, what capacity planning and the optimal incentive-programming manager plan to develop, and how much effort worker would like to input, will be influenced by the three key factors：the uncertainty of throughput and the risk-averse coefficient of agents accordingly.

並列關鍵字

incentive mechanism ； principle-agent model ； responsibility accounting ； hierarchical structure

參考文獻

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