會計師篩選客戶與和解策略之分析

Strategic Interaction Between Screening Clients and Settlement

林芳伊(Fang-Yi Lin)

指導教授 ： 戚務君 ； 簡俱揚

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2003年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200300293

摘要

本研究以分性模式探討會計師如何利用客戶篩選與法律政策來管理訴訟風險。本文的研究重心為：(i) 在和解機制下，會計師的最適和解策略；(ii) 在和解機制下，會計師的最適篩選客戶策略；(iii)和解機制對於會計師法律成本的影響。
　　本文發現，在允許和解的情況下，會計師存在一個最適和解策略，即會計師可以提供一個和解金額等於投資人採取訴訟策略的期望報酬，該金額低於會計師採取非和解策略之期望成本。
　　另外，在其他條件不變，和解機制成立的條件下，當無風險客戶的先天比重提高、高篩選作業的增額訊號品質下降、客戶發生「劣情境」機率降低、會計師面臨訴訟的勝訴機率上升、裁定為會計師敗訴之損害賠償金額減少、投資人訴訟成本變大或者審計公費提高，會計師會傾向選擇低篩選作業。反之，會計師會選擇高篩選作業。
　　最後，本文分析和解機制對於會計師法律成本的影響。本文的結論為，無論會計師的篩選投資水準多寡，當會計師面臨訴訟時，在單期的賽局分析下，非和解策略為一個被和解策略凌駕的策略。會計師選擇和解策略的期望成本小於非和解策略的期望成本，因此要求成本極小化的會計師一定發生採取和解策略的均衡。

關鍵字

篩選客戶 ； 訴訟成本 ； 和解策略 ； 訴訟風險 ； 審計品質

並列摘要

This study uses analytical method to study how CPA firms use screening clients and litigation policy to manage their litigation risk. Three objectives of this study are to analyze: (i)under the legal environment with settlement, which is the optimum settlement strategy of auditor; (ii)under the legal environment with settlement, which is the optimum screening strategy of auditor; (iii)the effects of allowing settlement on the auditor legal cost.
Results indicate that, CPA firms have an optimum settlement strategy on the basis of permitting settlement. That is auditor can offer a settlement amount equal to the expected litigation payoff of investor.
Additional, the results indicate that, when other conditions holding constant, the auditor’s optimal screening investment decreases as the prior probability of non-risky client increases, the incremental signal quality of high screening investment decreases, the probability of a bad outcome decreases, the probability of winning the suit increases, the damage award decreases, the legal costs of investor increases and the audit fee increases. On the other hand, auditor’s optimal screening investment will increase.
Finally, this study shows that regardless of the level of investment in client screening, when CPA firms against a lawsuit, CPA firms will always choose settlement in a single-period model.

並列關鍵字

screening client ； litigation cost ； settlement strategy ； audit quality ； litigation risk

參考文獻

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