管理當局符合或打敗強制性財務預測的溢酬

The Rewards to Meeting or Beating Firm's Mandatory Management Forecasts

何搵財(Wen-Tsai Ho)

指導教授 ： 曹壽民 ； 簡俱揚

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2003年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200300395

摘要

本研究針對財務預測修正、非預期盈餘和預測誤差三者之正負向關係，來探討關於預期管理、盈餘持續性、符合或打敗盈餘預測的盈餘持續性和結合符合或打敗盈餘預測、預期管理及盈餘管理三者關係之研究，並且探討投資人對其是否給予溢酬。
本研究以複迴歸來證實投資人對非預期盈餘，亦即符合或打敗盈餘預測的溢酬，並且在盈餘管理方面，採Modified Jones Model 估計裁決性應計項目，實證
結果如下：
一、在預期管理方面：
本研究實證結果和預期管理假設一致，第一、負向非預期管理之比例較負向預測誤差之比例低，且其差異，隨時間有增加趨勢。第二、在負向預測誤差下，其有正向或零非預期盈餘之比例較零或正向預測誤差其有負向非預期盈餘高，有預期管理存在，且隨時間有增加趨勢。
二、在符合或打敗盈餘預測之溢酬方面：
實證結果顯示在控制預測誤差之下，在預測誤差大小在2.5%增額下，有利的非預期盈餘(•-Up paths)比不利的非預期盈餘的累積異常報酬較高，此差異沒有統計上顯著性。投資人對有打敗盈餘預測公司給予溢酬的幅度是大於無法打敗盈餘預測給予的懲罰，且對符合盈餘預測公司及打敗盈餘預測公司給予之溢酬是不同，此兩個假說均獲得支持且具統計上顯著性。
三、在符合或打敗盈餘預測盈餘持續性方面：
實證結果均支持投資人對實際盈餘為有利潤、上升和財務預測在門檻內之公司給予較高報酬。
四、在符合或打敗盈餘預測的溢酬的持續性方面：
經常打敗盈餘預測公司投資人給予較高報酬。
五、在結合符合或打敗盈餘預測、預期管理和盈餘管理方面：
關於預期管理方面，實證支持有預期管理存在，當投資人知悉管理當局可能對盈餘預測有作預期管理情形時，對於在符合或打敗盈餘預測時，會給予較低報酬，但因沒有統計上顯著性，故沒獲得支持。
關於盈餘管理方面，實證結果指出當投資人得知管理當局有以盈餘管理來符合或打敗盈餘預測時，會給予較低報酬，並且我們以隨機漫步模式計算其結果亦無重大差異。

關鍵字

盈餘管理 ； 非預期盈餘 ； 預期管理 ； 強制性財務預測

並列摘要

This study discusses the relationship between earning forecast revisions,earning surprises and forecast errors, in an attempt to explore expectation management, earning persistence, persistence of meeting or beating earning forecast
(MBE), and the integration of meeting or beating earning expectation, expectation management and earning management. Moreover, we will explore whether investors regard the above mentioned.
This study concludes by multiple regressions that investors reward earning surprise, i.e. meeting or beating firms' management forecast. Modified Jones Model was used to estimate discretionary accrual components.
The empirical study concludes that:
A. Expectation Management: The empirical results are consistent with the expectation management hypothesis. A) The percentage of negative earning
surprises over the entire sample size is lower than the percentage of negative forecast error. In addition, the difference in percentage between negative earning surprises and negative forecast errors increases over time. B) The proportion of
firms with positive or zero forecasts that end with negative surprises is smaller than the proportion of firms with negative forecast errors that end with positive surprises, expectation management exists and the trend increases over time.
B. Rewards to meeting or beating firms' mandatory management forecast: Empirical study shows that with forecast errors under control, every 2.5% incremental increase of forecast error, CAR associated with a favorable earning surprise is
higher than that associated with paths associated with unfavorable earning surprise. This difference is not statistically significant.
Investors' reward to firms beating earning forecast is more than investors' penalty for failing to beat earning forecast. Also, the rewards are different for firms meeting earning forecast and firms beating earning forecast. Both hypotheses were supported and statistically significant.
C. Earning consistency: Empirical results supports that investors give higher rewards
to firms with positive earning, increased earning and not lowering earning forecast.
D. Meeting or beating earning forecast: Investors give higher rewards to firms frequently beating earning forecast.
E. Integration of meeting of beating earning forecast, expectation management and earning management: A) Expectation management: Empirical evidence supports the existence of expectation management. Investors give lower rewards to firms
meeting or beating earning forecast when they are aware of the possibility of firms expectation management to earning forecast. It is not supported due to its statistically insignificance. B) Earning management: Empirical evidence indicates that investors give lower rewards if they are aware that firms meet or beat earning forecast by earning management. Moreover, we calculated using random walk model and obtained results which are not significantly different.

並列關鍵字

mandatory management forecast ； earning surprise ； expectation management ； earnings management

參考文獻

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