所有權結構與新上市股票異常現象之關聯

IPO Anomalies and Ownership Structure

曾享平(Hsiang-Ping Tseng)

指導教授 ： 曹壽民 ； 鄒翊

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2004年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200400134

摘要

本研究以台灣新上市公司為對象，實證探討公司所有權結構在股票初次公開上市(initial　public offerings IPOs)時對承銷價、短期績效、以及蜜月期長短的關聯性研究。傳統上， 新上市股有初期正的報酬皆被認為是基於資訊不對稱及訊息傳遞的問題所引發。 但本研究是從公司治理的角度來檢視其對公司價值的影響，主要的預測關係是當公司治理機制愈佳，預期經理人正的誘因效果愈大，負的侵佔效果則愈小，而且公司之會計盈餘資訊內函將愈充足，由之， 公司之對外財報可信度愈能提高，而公司之股票價值愈能成長提昇。因此當公司在IPOs時，愈有能力與承銷商議價。且在上市後，其初始報酬也愈高，同時其股票上漲的蜜月期也愈能持久。

　　本研究引用La Porta(2002) 所提出股東對公司之控制權(選舉權)與現金流量權間之偏離程度做為衡量公司治理績效的因子。 依此理論當偏離程度趨小，公司治理成效變佳，承銷價也相對提高。 反之，公司治理變壞， 承銷價也轉弱。此外，本研究另引用Purnanandam & Swaminathan (2002) 之承銷價倍數來做衡量公司承銷價的參考。 依此原理， 本研究自已上市／櫃公司中選出相對的配對樣本。這些公司均上市滿一年以上， 資產規模相似，產品種類相同。 每一個公司之承銷價倍數是依据其承銷價及相對承銷日前一天之收盤價計算，並求得其價格價值比(P/V)。並就所有樣本及配對樣本之數据再做分組檢定 (ｔtests) 及迴歸預測 (regression predictions)。 主要結果証實本研究之關係預測 -- 治理較佳之公司其承銷比率較高. 這些公司在新股上市時，其承銷價格不易被低估外，其後更有較高的初始報酬，與較長的蜜月期

關鍵字

資訊不對稱 ； 公司治理 ； 股價低估 ； 訊息傳遞

並列摘要

The primary of this paper is to explore the association between the ownership structure and new issuing firm to underprice their stock, short-run behavior and honeymoon during initial public offerings(IPOs) date.Traditionally, the underpricing of a new stock was viewed as the consequence of both asymmetric information and inaccurate signaling in the general stock market. However, in this study, the corporate governance is postulated as the primary determinant of the productivity and valuation of all corporations. Under this proposition, we predict the valuation of a firm will significantly increase under better corporate governance because of its positive impact on more incentive effects in practice for managerial personnel, more earnings information available for the public, more accurate financial statements for credible dissemination, and maximal elimination of entrenchment effects in organizational functions. Therefore, during the initial public offerings period, a well structured and governed firm is in a better position to negotiate prices with all business counterparts. And after IPOs, the firm will continue its productivity and valuation. It will thus have higher initial returns and enjoy a longer honeymoon period. Further, following La Porta (2002) for this study, the corporate governance is measured by the divergence between the control rights (vote rights) and cash rights among the controlling shareholders. Basically, a small divergence would indicate a better corporate governance that would, in turn, lead to a higher offering price. Further, the concept of price multiple, proposed by Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2002) is also included for indexing the corporate governance. In empirical assessment, some similar IPO firms were sampled from the TSC or OTC Taiwan。These firms are comparable in size (total assets value) and products and all exceed one-year after the initial offering. For each studied IPO firm, a price-to-value (P/V) ratio was computed where P represents the offer price and V represents the fair value that was based on comparable firm’s market multiples in reference to the closing price of the day before the issuing date. The quantitative indices of all sampled firms were analyzed statistically, first by pairwise t-comparisons, and later by multiple regressions. The major significant findings supported the general research prediction. That is, companies with better corporate governance would result in the higher offered prices, the higher initial returns, and the longer honeymoon duration.

並列關鍵字

underpricing ； corporate governance ； signaling ； asymmetric information

參考文獻

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