股權結構、財務決策與公司績效關聯性之研究

A Study on the Relationships among ownership structure, financial policy and Corporation value

洪麗芳(Li-Fang Hung)

指導教授 ： 劉立倫

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2004年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200400384

摘要

中文摘要
自Berle and Means（1932）及Jensen and Meckling（1976）指出所有者與經營者間利益衝突所產生的代理問題，股權結構、公司價值與企業經營績效間關係，成為學者在理論及實務研究上的焦點；公司治理雖以監督公司管理階層，保障投資人基本權益為重點，惟其最終目的仍在於增加公司價值；然而，該透過哪些機制以緩和管理者與所有權人間代理問題，截至今日亦無定論；為使公司價值極大化，必須選擇最適內部人士及機構法人持股比率、股利決策及負債融資比率以使公司總代理成本降為最低。故本研究期望藉由股權結構、財務決策與公司績效間關聯性探討，為後續研究提供最佳股權結構、財務決策的方向。
本研究以台灣證券交易所掛牌上市公司為研究對象，模型變數資料皆來自台灣經濟新報資料庫（TEJ）。公司公開資訊資料來源自1989年至2002年，共14年。本文將股權結構分成內部投資者和機構投資者，選取資產報酬率、風險、資本支出、股利支付率、負債∕權益比例、公司規模、產業等變數，探討彼此間關係。此外，為更進一步了解股權結構真實狀況，將法人機構身份分為五大類，內部人士身份分三大類，進行複迴歸檢定分析。
實證結果顯示，在機構法人持股比例實證結果方面，機構法人持股比例與資產報酬率、風險和負債∕權益比例均不顯著。其與股利支付率為顯著正相關，機構法人持股比例與資本支出呈顯著負相關，研判是因為機構投資者較重視公司短期利潤及股利發放所致。
在內部人士持股比例實證結果方面，除了資本支出外，其他皆為顯著。其中，內部人士持股比例與公司績效成顯著正向相關，並符合「利益收斂假說」。內部人士與風險及股利支付率都呈負相關；與負債∕權益呈正相關，研判可能是董監事希望藉由負債治理機制的發揮，降低監督成本，使得公司代理成本降低所致。

關鍵字

股權結構 ； 代理問題 ； 股利支付率 ； 資本支出

並列摘要

Abstract
After Berle（1932）and Jensen（1976）indicated the agency problems caused by the benefits conflict between owner and manager, the ownership structure, firm value, and enterprise performances become the focused of scholars’ research. Although good corporate governance practice could result in better management efficiency, the ultimate goal of these practices is to enhance corporation’s value. In this research we would like to discuss the relationship between ownership structure, firm value, and enterprise performances.
The corporations, which entered the Taiwan stock market, are the study objects of this research. The reference material was collected from Taiwan Economic Journal （TEJ） from 1989 to 2002. The ownership structure was categorized into institutional investor and insider. In order to understand more real situation of ownership structure, we categorized five parts into institutional investor and three parts to insider. Moreover, we use multiple regressions to examine the result.
The result of institutional ownership shows that there is no significant stock holding ratio in ROE, firm risk and debt/benefit. There are a positive correlation between payout ratio and institutional ownership, and a negative correlation between capital expenditure and institutional ownership. It shows that the institutional ownership focus on short-term profit and capital expenditure.
In the insider ownership, we found that the insider is positively related to ROA and supporting convergence-of-interest hypothesis, but negatively related to stock market risk and payout ratio. We also found the positive relation between debt-equity ratio and insider.

並列關鍵字

agency problem ； capital expenditure ； dividend payout ratio ； ownership

參考文獻

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