以企業併購方式解決中國國有企業代理問題之研究

Resolving the Agency Problem in Stated-owned Enterprises in China by M&A Approach

洪韶君(Shao-Chun Hung)

指導教授 ： 朱德芳

中原大學/商學院/財經法律研究所/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200500075

摘要

本論文共分為第一章緒論、第二章代理理論與法律經濟分析、第三章中國國有企業概論、第四章國有企業問題探討與解決、第五章以併購模式改革國有企業以及最後一章結論等六章。
在第一章緒論中，論者首先論及撰寫本論文之研究動機與目的為說明。而在研究範圍與限制則將本論文所欲研究對象為一界定。本文係以「歷史研究法」、「法制批判法」以及「法律經濟分析」作為主要研究方法。
第二章先以探討代理理論為出發，在此特別就目前中國國有企業主要改革方針，亦即：大型股份有限公司為代理理論研究重心。在代理理論中，筆者提出代理關係之發生、代理問題（Agency Problem）引發之原因、代理關係所生之風險、代理成本（Agency Cost）等概念。在介紹代理成本等相關概念後，進一步採以法律經濟分析觀點作為解決現代企業代理問題之切入點。
第三章係對中國國有企業之定義、特徵、形成背景、發展歷程為一概括論述，藉由相關介紹，導引出中國國有企業長久存在之積弊問題，以及過去中國國有企業改革成效分析，並提出改革法制分析。緊接著對於中國加入世界貿易組織後，國有企業受到之衝擊，以及提出中國日後應採取如何因應之道，以利國有企業在國際經濟邁向全球化求取競爭力。
第四章將代理理論與國有企業改革為結合性探討。針對大型股份制國有企業所面對之代理問題提出說明，並指出現行中國國有企業治理問題所在以及國有企業代理問題之發生，同時提出解決方式。
第五章提出企業併購概念，並從法律經濟分析角度分析併購動機，進一步提出藉以併購模式作為國有企業改革手段之可能性。
在第六章結論中，提出對於中國國有企業改革的六大建議，以及最後就整篇論文作一總體性的結論，提出以併購手段使中國國有企業逐步邁向民營化，作為其最終改革目標。

關鍵字

代理問題 ； 中國大陸國有企業 ； 併購

並列摘要

Six chapters are mentioned in this thesis. ChapterⅠis the introduction. ChapterⅡ describes the concept of the Agency Theory and the Economics Analysis of law. Chapter Ⅲ introduces the rhyme of the State-owned Enterprises in China. In Chapter Ⅳ, I expound the questions of the State-owned Enterprises and discuss the solutions. Chapter Ⅴ studies the reform of the State-owned Enterprises through merger and acquisition, and finally I make a conclusion in Chapter Ⅵ.
The details of each chapter will be standard as follows:
ChapterⅠ illustrates the motives, methods, limitations and scope of this paper. “Historical Approach,” “Legal Analysis Approach” and “Economic Analysis of Law” are used as the main study approaches.
In ChapterⅡ, I start with the concept of the “Agency Theory,” and especially focus on the restructuring policy of State-owned Enterprises in China. In the part of Agency Theory, I explain the sources and risks of the principle agency relationship, the causes of agency problem and the concept of the agency cost. After introducing the related concepts of the Agency, I suggest the economic analysis of law to resolve the Agency Problems in modern enterprises.
Chapter Ⅲ states State-owned Enterprises in China in terms of the definition, characters , background and development , and reexamines the long-existing malpractice and the results of the reforms. In addition, I analyze the impact on State-owned Enterprises after China became a member of WTO and address practical measures to enhance their international competitive ability in the global economy.
In Chapter Ⅳ, I confer the correlation between the agency theory and State-owned Enterprises. At first, I point out the agency issues that large scale State-owned Enterprises have long been faced with. Then I discuss the potential problems of corporate management in these enterprises, and at last I represent possible solutions to the matter.
ChapterⅤ describes the concept of merger and acquisition and analyzes the motives of M&A from the angle of the Economic Analysis of Law. Furthermore, I argue M&A is an alternative to reform the State-owned Enterprises in China.
Chapter Ⅵ is the conclusion of this thesis. In this chapter, I provide six suggestions to the reform of State-owned Enterprises in China and submit an overall conclusion that merger and acquisition is one of the ways to achieve the final goal of privatization of State-owned Enterprises.

並列關鍵字

State-owned Enterprises in China ； M&A ； the Agency Theory

參考文獻

39.溫世仁，《溫世仁觀點：中國經濟的未來》，第1版，天下遠見，台北，2003年6月。

4.王志誠，＜企業組織再造彈性化之政策取向與課題＞，《國立中正大學法學集刊》，第11期，頁143～220，民92年4月。

59.謝哲勝，＜法律經濟學基礎理論之研究＞，《中正法學集刊第四期》。

57.劉逖，＜外商收購大陸上市公司法律制度研究＞，《法令月刊》，第53卷第8期，頁45～50。

28.張晉芬，《台灣公營事業民營化經濟迷思的批判，中央研究院社會學研究所，台北，民國九０年二月。