董事對於公司及其股東負有受託義務,而董事的受託義務包含忠實義務與注意義務,其中注意義務又可區分為兩個部分,即決策功能和監督功能兩者,這二者在內涵及判斷標準上各有不同。董事在履行決策義務時,在決策之程序上有商業判斷原則之適用,至於未涉及決策之監督義務,董事在大多時候皆無法援引商業判斷原則之保護。 商業判斷原則是提供董事保護,鼓勵董事勇於任事,董事就經營公司業務之行為符合商業判斷原則之要件時,該原則除了可以保護董事免於對該決策所造成之結果負責外,還可維持該決策之效力。 此外,公司如同自然人一般,其行為亦須符合法令,故董事在履行其監督義務時,負有監督公司日常營運符合法令之義務。積極言之,董事實負有設置一符合法令之機制,以協助其監控公司之日常業務行為,使公司之行為能夠確實符合法令。 最後一章,則是針對股東代表訴訟之要件加以討論。首先介紹美國及日本的股東代表訴訟,再和我國的股東代表訴訟相比較,以作為修法時之參考。本章重點主要集中在對董事會之請求,討論有關請求豁免、請求拒絕及運用獨立委員會之相關問題。
Corporate directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation they serve and its shareholders. These fiduciary obligations include the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. Besides, director’s duty of care can be divided into two parts-- the decision-making function and the oversight function .Both of them have different context and standard. In a decision making context, the business judgment rule applies to alter and to limit the duty to one of process. In a non-decision making or oversight context, however, the business judgment rule will not apply most of the time. The business judgment rule affords directors protection and encourages directors to engage in ventures which have potential for the corporation but at the same time entail some risk. If directors conduct the corporate business in compliance with elements of the business judgment rule, the rule protects both the directors from liability for damages stemming from their decisions and the decisions they make. In addition, the corporation in the conduct of its business, like all natural person, is under an obligation to act withtin the boundaries set by law. In other words, directors have an obligaions to oversee the daily operation of the corporation in compliance with the law when discharging their duty to monitor. Further, directors are obliged to establish law compliance systems which will assist them to monitor the corporation’s daily business and affairs and to ensure the conporation’s compliance with the law. Finally, the last chapter discusses the elements of shareholder derivative suits. It first introduces the shareholder derivative suits in the U.S. and Japan, and then compares them with Taiwan’s derivative suit. Demand on the board of directors is the main focus of this part, discussing relevant questions regarding demand excused, demand refused and use of independent committee.
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