論金融監理一元化的迷思—以銀行法與證券法為中心

The Myth of Single Regulatory Model: A Comparative Study on Institutional Regulation and Functional Regulation

杜偉成(Wei-Chen Tu)

指導教授 ： 莊永丞

中原大學/商學院/財經法律研究所/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200500704

摘要

本論文旨在探究金融監理一元化概念所代表的真正意涵，並檢討設置單一金融主管機關所能產生的實質監理效益。

就銀行法規範的觀點來看，公權力之所以會介入銀行業的經營活動，最主要理由在於銀行業的特殊性；銀行不同於其他的金融及非金融機構，具有極為特殊的資產負債結構，同時並肩負提供社會大眾資金流動服務，以及傳達國家貨幣政策的任務。因此為了避免存款人擠兌銀行，引發連鎖倒閉的風潮出現，監理機關必須嚴格密集地監控各個銀行的財務風險。

同樣的，立法者特別制定證券交易法，設置證券監理機關的原因，在於有價證券交易行為的特殊性。由於有價證券係表彰投資標的未來的獲利表現，證券發行人永遠比證券投資人更清楚知悉自身企業的經營展望，發行人與投資人兩者立於資訊極端不對稱的地位。因此為避免證券交易市場出現逆選擇現象，相關交易行為必須適用特別法規範，並由專門機關監管，如此方能有效維護交易秩序。

質言之，銀行法規範的理由在於銀行機構的特殊性，主管機關執法的第一步即是釐清「何謂銀行業」，以「機構別監理」概念劃定管轄範圍；而證券法的規範精神則在於區別「何謂有價證券」，主管機關必須根據「功能性監理」的概念行使職權，監管各個有價證券交易活動之參與者。由於銀行及證券監理者著重的議題不同，因此在分採機構別及功能性概念的監理架構下，銀行與證券監理者監管事務當不至於出現過度重疊的情況。美國國會1999年通過的金融服務現代化法案，一方面開放金融業以控股公司模式從事跨業經營，另一方面即兼採機構別與功能性監理的觀點，分別賦予聯準會及證券交易委員會不同的監理職責，令其針對銀行法以及證券法議題，共同監管金融控股公司的跨業經營活動。

相對於美國的多元化金融監理架構，我國立法者追尋英國的腳步，試圖藉由「金融監理一元化」改革，設置權限整合的金融主管機關，作為開放金融機構跨業經業的因應措施；本論文質疑這種一元化思維的實質意義。蓋金融體系並非毫無區隔界線，一元化的金融監理者於應付「多元化」的監理議題時，勢必仍得區別銀行及證券業務，分設不同的內部監理單位，並採用相異的監理措施；因此即便是號稱一元化整合最為徹底的英國金融服務局（FSA），也無法發展出一體適用於各種金融活動及金融機構的監理手法。

總結言之，本論文認為在當前金融業跨業經營的潮流下，各監理者更應從「經濟實質面」區別出所欲規制的金融交易活動，進而妥適地適用金融法規。過度強調監理一元化的整合概念，不但無助於解決形形色色的金融交易糾紛，反而將造成金融消費者混淆各類金融商品風險的疑慮。

關鍵字

傘狀監理模式 ； 行政院金融監督管理委員會 ； 投資銀行 ； 證券商 ； 機構別監理 ； 英國金融服務及市場法案 ； 美國金融服務現代化法案 ； 貨幣市場共同基金 ； 功能性監理 ； 一元化金融監理機關 ； 商業銀行 ； 金融控股公司

並列摘要

The researching purpose of the thesis is finding out what “single financial regulatory model” means, and trying to examine the supervisory efficiency of unitary financial regulator.

Generally speaking, the regime created to regulate banks recognizes the unique risks presented by a bank’s balance sheet and the special place of banks in economy. There are three unique economic functions of all depository institutions (commercial banks). First, commercial banks tend to have very little equity relative to other firms, and invest in illiquid loan assets while gathering funds from demand deposits for the most part. It means that even banks with healthy balance sheets and no loss in the underlying value of their assets (loan portfolios) can be forced into bankruptcy. Second, deposit institutions are the most important liquidity provider. Third, central bank must rely on commercial banks as the monetary policy conduit.

In the securities exchanging process, the issuers always hold more material information about the expected profit of their enterprise than outside investors do. Then, related economics theses had demonstrated that legislator and regulator should take responsibility for enacting and executing specialized securities laws (including special mandatory disclosure and anti-fraud rules) to avoid “adverse selection” and “moral hazard” phenomena occurring in the securities markets.

Conceptually, the securities law regime is based on what regulatees do rather than who they are. That is exactly the functional regulation concept. In contrast, the primary regulatory trigger under the banking laws lies in the definition of a bank which rests on combination of activities in which a bank is engaged. Banking laws are enacted under the institutional regulation concept. In this thesis, I assert that functional regulation is born out of securities laws while institutional regulation is associated with banking regulation. Therefore, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 adopts a hybrid of both functional and institutional regulation to assign the supervisory jurisdiction between the Fed and SEC rationally.

Contrast with the U.S. financial regulatory structure, the Taiwanese legislator had followed the U.K.-style reforming step, established the “Financial Supervisory Commission” as integrated financial regulator. In my opinion, since the financial system is always “diversified”, regulatory regime should inevitably divide by functional or institutional lines. That is to say, banking law only applies on commercial banks for their special financial structure and unique economic function. By the same token, securities laws only apply to investment transactions for the reason that investors always rely ample and truthful information to make decision. While regulators and courts are taken to settle the disputes in both banking and securities markets, the first thing they have to do is defining what is a bank and what is a security. Therefore, the proposal of establishing a single financial regulator to execute a unified financial law is nothing but meaningless.

並列關鍵字

Money Market Mutual Fund ； Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ； Financial Supervisory Commission (Taiwan). ； Financial Services and Markets Act (U.K) ； Institutional Regulation ； Securities Firms ； Single Financial Regulator ； Functional Regulation ； Investment Banking ； Commercial Banking ； Umbrella Regulatory Model ； Financial Holding Companies

參考文獻

吳元曜，〈對行政院金融監督管理委員會組織法之評析〉，台灣本土法學雜誌，第61期（2004年8月）。

沈中華，金融市場，華泰文化事業股份有限公司，初版，2002年。

黃昱程，現代金融市場，華泰文化事業股份有限公司，初版，1999年。

曾宛如，證券交易法原理，自版，二版，2001年。

Goodhart, Charles, Hartmann, Philipp, Llewellyn, David, Rojas-Suarez, Liliana & Weisbrod, Steven, FINANCIAL REGULATION WHY, HOW AND WHERE NOW? (1998).