透過您的圖書館登入
IP:44.223.31.148
  • 學位論文

閉鎖性公司控制股東壓迫行為之防止-兼論股票評價

Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close Corporations:Oppression and Stock Valuation

指導教授 : 楊竹生
若您是本文的作者,可授權文章由華藝線上圖書館中協助推廣。

摘要


根據我國企業之分布態樣,高達十餘萬家中小企業屬於股份有限公司之型態,該等企業大多具有股東人數少、股份無公開流通市場、經營與所有合一等閉鎖性公司之特質,惟我國現行公司法制對於大型之股份有限公司之諸多規範,未必均適用於中小型之閉鎖性股份有限公司,致發生法律規範不符合實際需求之情形。再者,在傳統多數決及中央控制原則下,閉鎖性公司的少數股東容易成為控制股東壓迫行為的受害者。美國各州普遍藉由制定法或案例法,保護閉鎖性公司的少數股東,以防止控制股東之壓迫行為。然而,國內公司法制對於控制股東壓迫行為之防止卻較少關注。爰根據美國相關法制及實務見解,首先探討閉鎖性公司及控制股東之界定、控制股東壓迫行為之認定等議題。其中,壓迫行為之認定標準主要分就控制股東與少數股東之觀點,探討信託義務原則及逐漸廣受採用的合理期待原則,兩種標準並非截然互斥且判斷結果亦逐漸趨於一致。此外,並就控制股東壓迫行為之防止,區分為事先之預防及事後之救濟,加以論述。事先預防主要探討股東合約之採用,即由股東預先約定公司事權或彼此間權利義務事項,以緩和中央控制或多數決原則對少數股東之威脅。就事後救濟而言,因閉鎖性公司小股東之持股欠缺公開流通市場,故而收購股份係一相當重要之退場機制,亦是法院給予衡平救濟的重要方法之一;惟股份價格有賴當事人達成協議或由法院審酌裁定,其結果對於小股東權益之保障影響甚鉅,爰一併就股票評價理論與採用情形等詳予分析,並延伸探討少數股權折價及流通性折價之應用與相關見解。最後,為使受壓迫股東有較直接及完整之保護機制,建議立法規範閉鎖性公司、控制股東及壓迫行為之界定,並規範控制股東壓迫行為之防免與救濟等事宜。

並列摘要


According to statistics, over one hundred thousand small businesses in Taiwan registered as Company Limited by Shares, whereas most of them have merits of close corporations. Shareholders holding minority interests in close corporations are at risk of unfair or oppressive treatment by the majority or controlling shareholders, to an extent well beyond that of their counterparts in public corporations. Largely due to the principle of centralized control or majority rule and the lack of a market exit, minority shareholders of close corporations are particularly vulnerable to abuse. Therefore, American jurisdictions afford protections to the close corporation minority investors from the improper exercise of majority control. Curiously, however, our Company Act provides little guidance on this issue. Besides introducing the statutory basis for close corporations, controlling shareholders, this thesis also addresses two general standards for shareholder oppression. The two overlap, both in concepts and in results, but display different perspectives. The more traditional "fiduciary duty" analysis posits that shareholders with sufficient ownership of shares to have control over corporate decision-making owe a duty to the minority to avoid overreaching. An alternate approach that is growing in acceptance is the "reasonable expectations" analysis, adopting the perspective of the minority shareholders. Under this approach, corporate decisions may be found oppressive because they violate the expectations that the minority reasonably maintained toward employment or remuneration. Moreover, this thesis addresses the prevention mechanism, shareholders’ agreements, which could be implemented to alleviate the threat resulting from centralized control or majority rule principle. As for remedies granted for oppression, especially elected or compulsory buyout is recommended. Thereby, critical issues concerned are the methodology of stock valuation for close corporations and whether "fair value" should include any discounts for minority status or lack of marketability of the shares. Finally, the last part of this thesis draws the conclusions about the framework of legal protection for the oppressed minority shareholders.

參考文獻


王志誠,閉鎖性公司少數股東之保護,政大法學評論,第89期,2006年。
財團法人萬國法律基金會,公司法制全盤修正計畫,2003年。
王文宇,表決權契約與表決權信託,法令月刊,第53卷,第2期,2002年。
枋啓民,少數股東民事訴訟救濟制度之檢討,國立臺灣大學法律學院法律學研究所碩士論文,2007年。
Illig, Robert C., Minority Investor Protections As Default Norms: Using Price to Illuminate the Deal in Close Corporation, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 275 (2006).

被引用紀錄


黃昱璋(2012)。新股發行制度相關問題之研究 --以少數股東權益保護為中心〔碩士論文,中原大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6840%2fcycu201200573

延伸閱讀