本論文在於探討日本企業集團對於集團內上市公司之研發投資、道德風險及現金持有之影響。運用1994年至2004年共3,499家上市公司,共35,990樣本點進行實證,而且使用日本企業集團資料庫,此資料庫將離集團核心體系之親疏遠近,劃分成四項程度的影響係數。第一篇論文探討重心在於研發投資、槓桿及公司價值之互動關係,運用聯立方程模型 (SEM),結果顯示研發對公司價值有正向且顯著影響,反之亦然,而隨集團影響係數愈大,影響愈大。第二篇論文進而討論集團對集團內上市公司之道德風險的影響,討論資產替代、低度投資、現金股利、債權稀釋,對公司債權人及股東間之代理問題,本篇為更細緻觀察整體樣本之OLS係數變化,遂以分量迴歸進行實證。最後一篇論文則探討集團內上市公司之現金持有程度,本文以Tobit迴歸進行實證,結果與文獻一致,愈接近集團核心者,其所需持有之現金流量愈少。
This dissertation examines how Japanese keiretsu-style main banks affect R&D investment, moral hazards, and cash holdings. The empirical database included 35,990 observations from 3,499 Japanese listed companies during 1994 to 2004. Furthermore, also adopt to sort influence of different keiretsu groups by a four-point scale in our database. In first essay examines how Japanese keiretsu-style main banks affect the interrelationships among R&D investment, leverage, and firm value with Simultaneous Equations Model (SEM). The finding is R&D investment positively affects firm value. Adding the keiretsu influential power test, our evidence also shows that R&D investment is monotonically increasing with the keiretsu influential power; firms with closer relationships to the core of its main bank are experiencing higher R&D, and therefore, create the highest firm value. The second study analyzes the ways in which the Japanese main bank plays a role as a monitor to lower agency costs when faced with conflicts between shareholders and liability holders. Literature reveals that the agency cost between shareholders and debt-holders stems from asset substitution, under-investment, dividend payout, and long claim dilution. Employing Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation and quantile regression are the methodologies, In sum, the findings are that the keiretsu firms have asset substitution, under-investment, and long claim dilution problems in OLS estimation. However, in quantile regression, the main bank can certainly mitigate this moral hazard of asset substitution, when member firms’ quantiles are high. In third essay examines the tunnel function of horizontal keiretsu amidst changing economics and the regulatory climate that existed in Japan between 1994 and 2004. The affiliated firms that form a business group known as a keiretsu access unique capital support from their core financial institutions and form their own internal capital market. This paper demonstrates that the closer the relationship between the affiliated firms and their keiretsu core banks, the less cash they hoard. Using Tobit regression and finding that the keiretsu main banks significantly reduce corporate cash holdings, given that the main bank in keiretsu can be viewed as an internal funding channel.
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