近年來國內外陸續發生大型公司財務報導不實之會計醜聞後,遂引發各界質疑現行公司治理(corporate governance)機制之有效性。由於所有權與經營權分離及大股東與小股東間利益衝突所產生之代理問題(agency problem),當公司治理機制不甚健全的情況下,經理人或大股東可能會從事追求短期盈餘目標之盈餘管理行為。 研究與發展(research and development, R&D)支出對大部分企業而言是決定能否在國際環境中維持競爭力、提升企業價值與企業成長的主要關鍵之ㄧ。然而當管理當局有短視行為,將會損及企業的競爭優勢,甚至影響企業之永續經營。 本研究以2000年至2008年間台灣上市、櫃公司電子業為樣本,採用線性迴歸模型(linear regression model)探討股權結構型態與創新活動間之關聯性,除測試全體樣本資料外,本研究並分別以「零盈餘門檻」、「前期盈餘門檻」及「分析師預測門檻」為績效門檻,將樣本區分為盈餘小幅度減少樣本(SD)、盈餘增加樣本(IN)及盈餘大幅度減少樣本(LD)進行分析。實證結果顯示:(一)在全體樣本中,控制股東的的現金流量權與控制權偏離程度較小的公司,藉削減研發支出以達成短期盈餘目標的可能性將會減少。(二)在盈餘小幅度減少樣本(SD)中,控制股東的現金流量權與控制權偏離程度較小的公司,較無可能發生削減研發支出來達到零盈餘門檻、或達到前期盈餘門檻、或分析師預測門檻的短視行為。(三)在盈餘增加樣本(IN)中,控制股東的現金流量權與控制權偏離程度較小的公司,較無可能發生削減研發支出來達到零盈餘門檻、或達到前期盈餘門檻的短視行為。(四)在盈餘大幅度減少樣本(LD)中,控制股東的現金流量權與控制權偏離程度與削減研發支出以達盈餘門檻的短視行為無顯著關連。(五)在全體樣本、SD、IN及LD樣本中,控制股東的現金流量權與削減研發支出以達盈餘門檻的短視行為無顯著關連。
The primary objective of this study is to examine whether the ownership structure of Taiwanese electronic industry, measured by the divergence between the ultimate owners’ control and the equity ownership level create or reduce incentives for corporate managers to reduce investment in research and development (R&D) to achieve certain performance thresholds. These performance thresholds are defined as (1) to report positive profits, that is, to avoid losses; (2) to sustain prior year reported income, in other words, to avoid earnings decreases; (3) to meet analysts’ earnings forecast, in short, to satisfy market’s expectations. In addition to the entire sample, I also perform linear regression analysis to three subsamples of small decrease (SD), increase (IN) and large decrease (LD) in earnings. The empirical results indicate (1) in the entire sample, managers are less likely to cut R&D to reverse an earning decline when there is less divergence between the ultimate owners’ control rights and cash flow rights; (2) in the SD subsample, managers are less likely to cut R&D to achieve positive profits, prior year reported income and analysts’ earnings forecast when there is less divergence between the ultimate owners’ control rights and cash flow rights; (3) in the IN subsample, managers are less likely to cut R&D to achieve positive profits and prior year reported income when there is less divergence between the ultimate owners’ control rights and cash flow rights; (4) in the LD subsample, the managers’ myopic behavior is irrelevant to the divergence between the ultimate owners’ control rights and cash flow rights; (5) there is no significant relation between the factor of cash flow rights and the managers’ myopic behavior.