股權分配對道德風險以及生產誘因研究：一個台灣知名美髮連鎖沙龍體系之實證研究

The Impact of Stock Sharing on Moral Hazard and Production Incentive: An Empirical Study of A Well-Known Beauty Salon Chain Stores

黃奕文(Yi-Wen Huang)

指導教授 ： 曲祉寧

中原大學/商學院/企業管理研究所/碩士(2011年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201101061

摘要

中文摘要
台灣的美髮連鎖沙龍產業中，普遍面臨著設計師出走問題，此一問題對分店的業績影響甚鉅，因此如何成功留任設計師相當重要。成熟的設計師能清楚掌握消費者的需求，並能成功的滿足其需求，此一能力即為交易成本理論中的專屬性資產，而在GHM產權模型中又指出，將產權歸屬於擁有專屬性資產者，將能有效的激勵其投入更多的專屬性資產，而此一觀點與小林髮廊讓成熟的設計師持有分店的股份做法一致。但是在持有股份之後，對於身兼管理職的技術者而言，將同時面臨技術工作與管理工作，技術工作可清楚的判定績效，而管理工作不僅績效不易判定，且須承擔經營上的風險和學習內隱的管理知識，於是其將偏好於技術工作而非管理工作，此即為多重使命造成的道德風險問題。
本研究以小林髮廊為例，探討股權分配對於生產誘因的提升，以及多重使命下的道德風險關係。
關鍵字：交易成本、產權理論、資產專屬性、道德風險

關鍵字

交易成本 ； 產權理論 ； 資產專屬性 ； 道德風險

並列摘要

Abstract
The problem of designer turnover is a serious problem in salon industry. Because it will cause profit decrease. Therefore, how to keep designer stay is very important in salon industry. The senior designer can communicate with customer well and fit their demand. This ability is called asset specificity in transaction cost theory. The GHM model found that give property to someone who hold specify asset can motivate their input of specify asset. And this view is fit with what Show-Lin do. After these designer get shares, to some designer who is manger too, they have to be a designer and manager at the same time. The performance of designer can be easily measure but manager’s not. The manager have to bear some risk and learning some implicit knowledge. Therefore they will likely to be a designer and not to be a manager. This problem is called Multi-task moral hazard.
In this thesis, we will study how stock sharing affect production incentive and the relationship with moral hazard in Show-Lin.
Key words: Transaction cost theory, GHM model, Asset specificity, Moral hazard

並列關鍵字

Transaction cost theory ； Moral hazard ； Asset specificity ； GHM model

參考文獻

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