效率監督與利益同化對台灣企業的公司價值與管理者薪酬影響–股權結構觀點

The Influence of Efficiency Monitoring and Interest Assimilation on Taiwanese Corporate Value and Compensation of Top Management－ An Ownership Structure Perspective

楊燿鴻(Yao-Hung Yang)

指導教授 ： 嚴奇峰

中原大學/商學院/企業管理研究所/博士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/CYCU.2013.00009

摘要

本研究針對台灣電子產業與非電子業中，有關公司治理之效率監督與利益同化進行探討研究。在理論觀點上，有別於代理人理論與管家理論，採用家族企業組織雙元系統觀念切入，從組織成員結構的差序性觀點來發展出股權結構假說，探討股權結構之外圈、內圈、核心圈與家族化控制對公司治理的影響，以補足核心權益代理問題分析上的不足。
本研究以台灣上市櫃公司為主要研究對象，從台灣經濟新報資料庫中整理出2005至20011年的資料，運用STATA軟體進行分析。經過 F test 得知，所有模型都適用於OLS模型。實證結果顯示，外圈之外部法人機構持股增加會促進公司價值，也能提升管理者之薪酬，另一發現，當電子股之核心圈之席次股份偏離倍數增加，可促進公司價值，也能提升管理者薪酬，但非電子類股實證結果並不一致，其核心圈之席次股份偏離倍數增加會降低公司價值，但會提高管理者之薪酬。當核心圈向外合併內圈時即家族化控制時，電子類股顯示，家族控制化程度增加，會降低公司價值，管理者之間會以薪酬相互攏絡，進而圖利自己薪酬。電子類股與非電子類股因股權結構上的差異，對公司價值、董監事與高階經理人薪酬的影響，產生不同的結果。
本文之貢獻在提出股權結構觀點，依照股權結構所處的位置，提出合理的說明，充分反應出台灣社會特殊的股權結構與管理型態，分析企業與其股東之間利益的連結，提供企業更完整的探討，補充過去文獻分析之不足。實務上建議，上市櫃公司可增加其外部法人的持股比率以促進效率監督的力量。電子類股公司控制股東需盡量兼任董監事，方能透過董事會清楚掌握公司方向，使得核心圈的權力結構更緊密進而促進經營效率。相反地，非電子類股公司則因控制股東不比電子類股專業，並不建議由控制股東擔任董監事掌握董事會，本文建議可多讓專業經理人進入董事會，使董事會充份掌握公司營運資訊以促進決策品質。

關鍵字

股權結構觀點 ； 雙元系統 ； 利益同化 ； 公司治理 ； 效率監督

並列摘要

The reasearch investigated efficiency monitoring and interest assimilation in the corporate governance of the electronics industry and the non-electronics industry in Taiwan. Rather than agency theory and stewardship theory, we employed the concept of the family-enterprise dual system as the breakthrough point and developed the research hypotheses from the different degrees of intimacy of the organization member (shareholder) structure to investigate how the outer circle, the inner circle, the core circle, and a shareholding structure influence corporate governance by familization, compensating for the deficiency in central agency problem analyses.
We selected listed companies in Taiwan as the research objects, sorted the 2005-2011 data from the archives of the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ), and analyzed the data using STATA. The F test result showed that all the models were applicable to the OLS model. The empirical results indicated that the corporate value and compensation of the top management of a company increases when the shareholding of outside institutional shareholders in the outer circle increases. In addition, the corporate value and compensation of the top management of an electronics company increases when the seat-share deviation multiple of the core circle rises. However, the empirical results of non-electronics companies were inconsistent. The corporate value of a non-electronics company decreases, but the compensation of top management increases when the seat-share deviation multiple of the core circle rises. When the core circle of an electronics company merges with the inner circle, a process called familization, the increased familization reduces corporate value, and managers collaborate with each other through compensation and further benefit their own compensation. The differences among ownership structures between electronics and non-electronics companies cause various influences on corporate value and the compensation of directors, supervisors, and high-level managers.
The contributions of this study lie in providing an ownership structure perspective that addresses the position of the ownership structure to explore differences in corporate governance, and reflects on the special ownership structure and management types in Taiwan. The perspective enables analyzing the beneficial connection between a company and shareholders, providing enterprises with a more complete investigation, and supplementing insufficiency in previous literature and analyses. We suggest that the shareholding ratio of the outside institutional shareholders of a listed company should increase to facilitate the power of efficiency monitoring. The controlling shareholders in an electronics company should serve concurrently as directors or supervisors to clearly direct the company through the board of directors, tighten the power structure of the core circle, and facilitate the management efficiency. In contrast, the controlling shareholders of non-electronics companies are less professional than those of electronics companies; thus, the controlling shareholders of a non-electronics company should not serve as directors or supervisors and control the board of directors. Professional high-level managers should serve on the board of directors of a non-electronics company to enable the board of directors to adequately control corporate operation information to increase the quality of decision-making.

並列關鍵字

ownership structure perspective ； dual system ； interest assimilation ； Corporate governance ； efficiency monitoring

參考文獻

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