本研究之目的係採用公司治理之變數來探討董事長兼任總經理之因素。以及董事長兼任總經理時,對公司績效之影響。在董事長兼任總經理之影響因素方面,實證結果顯示,當董事會監督能力愈弱時,較有兼任之情形。此外,董事長會為了員工分紅及員工認股權,而兼任總經理。最後,當產品市場競爭程度愈強時,愈有兼任之情形,因為單一領導權能迅速反應公司的狀況。在兼任對績效影響方面,公司治理良好的公司,能降低董事長兼任總經理對公司績效所造成不良的影響。而董事長會符合代理理論的自利動機,領取員工分紅及員工認股權,而不理會公司績效。最後,董事長兼任總經理時,對於競爭激烈的產品市場無法增進公司績效。
This study starts out from the notion of corporate governance to study the influential factors of the CEO duality that the interacting effect on the association between duality and performance. The study shows that the employee bonus, stock option and CEO duality have positive correlation. When the ability of board of directors to supervise is weak, and CEO duality is an efficient option. In CEO duality-performance association, strong corporate governance can reduce bad implicaions of CEO duality on performance. When the purpose of CEO duality is to receive employee bonus, stock option, it is detrimental to the company performance. Intensity of competition in product market also reduce has no effect on CEO duality-performance association.