卡特爾對消費者危害甚鉅,事業通常會藉由提高價格之聯合行為,以獲取高額之不法利益,並造成市場機制的不效率,我國公平交易法第十四條原則禁止聯合行為,但隨著時間之演進,事業對於聯合行為所採取之規避措施更加多元化,執法機關往往耗費過多人力物力,不一定能有效舉發該違法卡特爾,如何有效地舉發違法卡特爾,成為各國反托拉斯主管機關之重要課題,其中窩裡反條款(又名寬恕政策Leniency Programs)不僅為各國競爭法所採取之法制,更是打擊違法卡特爾之利器。 本文試圖探究窩裡反條款如何能有效打擊惡性卡特爾,針對公平會2003年提出之草案提出以增加誘因為促進此條款發揮最大效用之愚見,作為草案之改良,如政策上提供「揭露誘因」(incentive to confess),違法事業成員自行舉發之機會必然大大地提升,本文以「賽局理論之囚犯困境」作理性的經濟分析,並得出窩裡反條款確能創造違法聯合事業間之不信任,進而向主管機關舉發之結論,並檢討我國窩裡反條款引進之可能性,及其應有之配套措施。 依賽局理論,本文期能以「揭露」成為優勢策略(dominate strategy),並結成以下結論,首先,對於首倡者及教唆者如與政府合作亦能使之獲得寬恕;其次,對於揭露時點之放寬;其三,在司法機關已掌握相當證據之情況下,對於第一個揭露之事業亦能予以寬恕,上述變革必能降低窩裡反政策之不確定性,亦能強化卡特爾成員間之不信任感,如此之鬆綁卡特爾之政策,在未來必能有效抑制惡性卡特爾組織之形成,也能使現存惡性卡特爾組織更不易穩固。
Cartels injure consumers by raising prices. It creates allocative inefficiency by reducing production in order to raise market price, and they encourage productive inefficiencies by protecting inefficient manufactures, which can increase the average production costs in an industry. Concreted action is prohibited under Article 14 of the Fait Trade Act of Taiwan, R.O.C., in this regard, it become increasingly rare that the competition authority detects cartel in recent year. An effective leniency programs, can encourage cartel member to inform the authority about their illegal action. It also outlines and comments on the provisions of the leniency programs that were drafted in 2003 to amend the Fair Trade Act. The purpose of the article is to exam why the leniency policy has been so successful, base on that discussion, to suggest changes that would increase the program’s effectiveness even further. It is intuitive that if the government offers an incentive to confess, then confession will increase. Using a serious of prison’s dilemma models, this Article argues that government policies work by creating distrust among cartel co-conspirators. Besides, this article discusses the possibility of introduction of leniency policy and presents the prerequisites for adopting.