本文的目的在於反思當代過失理論趨向客觀化問題的處理。有鑑於當前刑法學對過失論述的主張,普遍在「去主觀不法化」發展中削弱對人的關注,選用外在角度對人的內在進行歸責,並趨向極端接受客觀歸責理論架構過失歸責的內涵,認為客觀歸責理論從其客觀觀察者的方法,充分提供了一個完善論證過失歸責與否的判斷工具。同時,司法實務在義務歸責導向,亦逐漸對個案失去當中人別探究與詳實調查的根本工作。對此本文認為,這樣的發展現象顯然背棄了過失概念應有的價值。 由於刑法對人的理解,體認到人的有限而明白規範建構當中考量個別處境的必要,因此,本源自於人的理解的過失概念,其關切對象應是個別人的情形,亦即個人主觀上的預見可能性。是故,本文從人的基礎嘗試重建思索過失論述,主張過失理論核心在於個人能力,並且唯有體現對人的同情與寬容,其存在價值始得以彰顯。此外,期盼規範層面的修正能夠引導司法實務開始真正關切人的理解,不僅於過失個案落實個人能力探求,審判工作對於人的理解,應自司法體制內部更有積極作為,實化人權思維。從而本文將藉由前述人的思索脈絡,一併反省理論歷史裡關於去主觀不法化與注意義務違反性等發展問題。
This study is a critical review of the objective-oriented development of negligent theory in criminal law, which rules out the “subjective injustice”(“subjektive Unrecht”) concept in the negligent crimes. Through an inspection of the history of negligent theory, I contend that “humanity” is a core concern in the original concept of “negligence”. However, owing to the objective-/ obligation-oriented academic interest as well as some misunderstanding of the mindset of a negligent actor, the concern of “humanity” has been overpassed. The objective-/ obligation-oriented theory has lifted judges to a dominating position to innovate any kind of obligation whenever he thinks he need to. As a result, the objective-/ obligation-oriented model has caused an improper expansion of negligent liability in criminal justice, which could make people liable for what they can’t shun. I argue that the concept of “negligence” initially had some “sympathy” and “toleration” for human being and, upon this basis, built up a red line for the government’s punishing power. The objective-oriented theory arouses a risk of overcrossing it, and has caused an inconsistent within the criminal law system.
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