本研究以台灣1991年至2005年共646家上市公司為研究樣本,探討銀行關係、經理人持股是否影響公司現金持有。結果發現,台灣上市公司在這十五年間,現金比率由1991年之10.73%增加至2005年之12.34%,淨負債比率則由1991年之17.32%減少至2005年之15.81%。在公司特徵變數方面,發現台灣上市公司現金比率與公司年齡、負債比率、淨營運資金比率、資本支出比率等變數呈負相關;與研發支出比率、市值對帳面值比、現金流量比率與股利發放率呈正相關。顯示公司融資能力與未來成長淺力決定現金持有的多寡,符合文獻上預防動機與資訊不對稱理論。經理人持股比率高低存在誘因共容效果與聯合效果,經理人持股率低於7.14%會與股東利益一致,持股率高於7.14%則會與股東利益發生衝突。本研究進一步探討公司在不同銀行關係下現金持有比率的狀況,發現當公司依賴銀行債且與極少數銀行有借貸關係時,公司現金比率最高,股東與經理人的代理問題亦最嚴重;當公司依賴銀行債但與多家銀行有借貸關係時,公司現金比率最少,存在於股東與經理人間之代理問題亦最低。
This paper investigates whether banking relationship and managerial ownership determine corporate cash holdings, the samples include Taiwan listed company(exclude financial company) during the period of 1991 to 2005. The empirical results shows cash holding of Taiwan listed company have raised from 10.73% to 12.34% and net debt ratio have declined from 17.32% to 15.81% in fifteen years. In firm-specific characteristics, we observe firm age、leverage and net working capital tends to be negatively related to cash holdings; R&D、market to book ratio、cash flow and dividend ratio tends to be positively related to cash holdings. The results support precautionary motive and information asymmetries for cash holdings. We also observe a significant non-monotonic relation between managerial ownership and cash holdings. Low managerial ownership(less than 7.14%) aligns manager incentives to shareholders interests but high managerial ownership(more than 7.14%) makes conflict between manager incentives and shareholder interests. We further investigate corporate cash holdings in different banking relationships, we find that when corporate depend on bank debt and with few bank lending relationships holds relatively high cash ratio, the interests conflicts between manager and shareholder seems to be significant in this situation; otherwise corporate hold relative low cash ratio when they depend on bank debt and with multiple banking relationships thus reduce the conflicts between manager and shareholder.