從法律經濟分析論公司目的與受託義務之法律規範

Corporate Goal and Regulation of Fiduciary Duty: A Law and Economics Perspective

徐肇鴻(Chao-Hung Hsu)

指導教授 ： 朱德芳

中原大學/商學院/財經法律研究所/碩士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200700862

摘要

由公司本質理論可知，公司是各參與者自願性依照公司契約所載之權利義務關係，將其所擁有之資源投入公司所形成之集合。由於握有此些資源控制權之經營階層其自身利益與參與者之利益並非一致，在資訊不對稱之影響下，各參與者依照公司契約中所應有之權益將未必被充分之滿足，此即所謂代理問題。各參與者可用以降低代理問題之機制有三：契約、市場與法律。從財產法則與責任法則之關係可知，應使契約與市場機制優先於法律機制之適用。只有在契約與市場之效能無法發揮時，法律方有介入之必要。契約機制所面對之限制為有限理性、交易成本與策略性行為；市場所遭遇之限制則有重複性交易之缺乏、不完全競爭、資訊上之限制和外部性與公共財。若契約與市場係因特定障礙而無法發揮，法律此時可以任意規定之方式介入。而若該問題為契約或市場機制充分發揮亦無法解決者，則法律應以強制規定之方式介入之。藉由此一觀點，受託義務係法律上所預設，對經營階層行為之原則性要求。
由於受託義務對經營階層所為要求將直接受到公司目的所影響，故於進入具體規範之討論前需就公司目的加以釐清。過去學者以所有權、效率與契約觀點認為公司目的在於極大化股份價值。但本文認為股東並非公司所有人，股份價值極大將出現無效率情形，學者於假設性協商分析對象之認知上亦有偏誤。本文由效率與契約之觀點認為公司目的應在於極大化所有對公司之財務上請求權價值，即投資人利益極大。此一原則不但與財務實務相符合，亦為真正得產生公司價值極大之效率結果者。
於受託義務之討論上，首先應釐清者為注意義務與忠實義務為規範不同行為所產生之不同規定。由於不當管理行為得以契約與市場方式加以嚇阻，法律機制之介入將產生高額成本，故應避免法院就決策之良莠進行事後之判斷。相反的，由於契約與市場機制對侵佔行為難以產生足夠之規範效力，法律規範之效果因此具相當重要性。為達到足夠之規範效果，法院應於董事有違反忠實義務外觀時倒置舉證責任。當董事確定有違反忠實義務情事時，法院所課責任數額應高於董事所獲利益。於注意義務之討論上，商業判斷原則之功能在於避免法院對董事會決策進行實質審查，其要件應集中於程序上之要求，且無須刻意採許寬鬆之標準。當商業判斷原則被推翻時，法院方應審查該決策是否符合注意義務之一般過失要求。於德拉瓦州判決所出現之公平性檢驗應為忠實義務之審查標準，浪費公司資產則為商業判斷原則適用時，法院所採取之例外審查標準。於忠實義務之討論上，無利害關係董事與股東所為之同意應以決策內容是否涉及公司控制權之變動為效力上之區分。若否，則符合此些安全港條款之決策應受到商業判斷原則之保護。若然，則仍應受到法院所為之公平性檢驗。當董事違反忠實義務時，應賦予法院得課以懲罰性賠償金等提高其責任數額之權力。

關鍵字

商業判斷原則 ； 董事優位 ； 股東優位 ； 注意義務 ； 忠實義務 ； 受託義務 ； 公司目的 ； 善意義務

並列摘要

Using several firm theories, this dissertation forms a model that corporation is a nexus of inputs provided by participant according to their voluntary agreements. Becacuse the interest of management who control these inputs is different to the participants, participants face the danger that their right may not be fully fulfilled. This problem was call agency problem. Agency problem was further deteriorate due to the information asymmetric between participant.
With three mechanisms such as contract, market and law, the participants are able to lower the risk causing by agency problem. According to conclusion from the relationship between “property rules” and “liability rules”, law should only interfere when contract and market machisms fail. When contract and market machism are only face some kind of barriers, law should interfere with enabling rules. But if the problem can not be resolve even when these two mechanisms come to full play, law should interfere with mandatory rules. With this insight, fiduciary duty should be deemed as enabling rule in order to regulate management behaviours.
Being the regulation of management behaviours, fiduciary duty was directly affected by the proposition of corporate goal. Most scholars had reached their conclusion from economic analysis that corporate should maximize the wealth of shareholders. The reasons behind this view can be catagoried to three aspects: property right, efficiency and contract. This dissertation contends that all these three aspects are wrong. Shareholders are not owners of the corporate and maximizaion of shareholders wealth is not always efficient. Base on the fundamental theory of finance, the cognition of investors using in hypothesis bargain analysis is wrong. This dissertation advocates that corporate should maximize the sum of all the financial claims to the corporation. In other word, corporate should maximize the wealth of rational investors.
In fiduciary duty, duty of care and duty of loyalty were design to deal with two kinds of management misbehaviours that impede maximization of investors’ wealth: mismanagement and misappropriation. The characters of mismanage had made contract and market become effecitive mechanism to control this kind of problem. The interference of law will only do more harm than help. In the meanwhile, the characters of misappropriation made contract and market mechanism nearly useless, so the law must provide effective determent effect. These difference should be reflected by the regulation of fiduciary duty.

並列關鍵字

duty of loyalty ； fiduciary duties ； duty of good faith ； corporate goal ； duty of care ； Director Primacy ； Shareholder Primacy ； Business Judgment Rule

參考文獻

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