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  • 學位論文

公司內部治理與外部監督之研究 ─以台灣上市汽車公司為例

A Study on Internal Governance and External Monitoring of Corporate– Listed Automobile Companies in Taiwan

指導教授 : 嚴奇峰

摘要


1997 年的亞洲金融危機,暴露了企業普遍存在公司治理機制不完善的問題。2008美國次級房貸風暴、雷曼兄弟的倒閉所引爆的全球金融大海嘯,它的骨牌效應,使得全世界金融信用體系萎縮,各國之企業相繼陷入經營危機,尋找企業弊案與倒閉原因之研究者,普遍認為問題出在公司治理未能有效落實所致。公司治理的觀念因而興起,並在全球蔓延開來,為各國調整企業經營體質所應用,公司治理機制被公認是企業對抗風暴的良方,並可以健全公司經營架構,來謀取公司和股東的最大利益。 本研究以2003至2011年台灣上市汽車公司的資料進行研究,利用Panel Data(縱橫資料)模型,處理本研究資料在橫斷面的異質性與時間序列自我相關等問題。運用Eviews 6.0版本之電腦軟體對研究假說進行實證分析。從台灣上市汽車產業的角度,研究公司內部、外部股權結構與公司經營績效的關聯性及影響。 本文研究發現包括二大部分,(一)在內部治理機制方面:(1)當內部股東持股比率愈高時,因利益共同體之故易導致經營績效愈差。(2)席次股份偏離倍數高,也就是最終控制者的席次控制權相對增加,股份控制權相對減少,易造成大股東侵犯外部股東權益的問題,導致公司績效下降。但同時也發現因獨立董事佔董事會席次比率偏低,以致無法替小股東扮演實質的監督角色,提高經營績效。(二)在外部監督機制方面:(1)負債比率對公司績效並無顯著影響,不能證明負債比率與公司經營績效的關係。(2)而在品牌母公司參與投資與經營方面,在經營條件之拘束與監督下,無法確認台灣上市汽車公司之外國法人持股比例高低對經營績效之影響。(3)由於台灣上市公司多屬於同集團或同一家族成員,控制股東對於董、監事會仍有相當的影響力,故外部法人持股在台灣上市汽車公司之監督功能相當有限,無助於公司經營績效的提升。 本研究說明公司內部治理與外部監督機制,對於公司經營績效有部分顯著的影響,其研究結果可作為主管機關、債權人、投資人及公司其他利害關係人,在擬定政策及進行投資時可做為重要的參考依據。

並列摘要


The Asian financial crisis in 1997 exposed the problem of inadequate corporate governance mechanism which commonly exists among enterprises. In 2008, the subprime mortgage crisis and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in U.S.A. caused a global financial collapse. The domino effect made the worldwide financial and credit system wither, and enterprises in various countries were successively trapped in business crises. Researchers studying the causes of corporate scandals and failures generally considered that the problem lay in that corporate governance was not effectively achieved. The concept of corporate governance thus emerged and spread all over the world. The concept was then employed by companies in a great number of countries to adjust the business constitution. Corporate governance mechanism is an accepted sound strategy for enterprises to confront financial storms, and it can also integrate corporate operating structure in order to seek the maximum benefits of enterprises and the shareholders. In this study, the data of the listed motor companies in Taiwan during 2003 and 2011 were investigated, and a Panel Data model was used to process the cross-sectional heterogeneity and time-series autocorrelation of the data. Eviews 6.0 was employed to empirically analyze the research hypotheses. The correlations between the internal and external shareholding structures of a company and the operating performance were studied from the perspective of listed motor companies in Taiwan. The findings of this study can be divided into two parts. The first part is “internal governance mechanism.” (1) The higher the internal shareholding ratio is, the worse the corporate performance probably is due to the interest assimilation of the inner circle. (2) If the seats and shares deviation multiples of an enterprise are high, that is, the seat control right of the ultimate controllers increases relatively, and share control right reduces relatively, the problems that the major shareholders’ infringement to the right of external shareholders will happen more easily, and the corporate performance will reduce. However, it is simultaneously found that in a company, when the seat ratio of independent directors in a board is too low, they can neither play an actual supervisory role for small shareholders nor increase the operating performance. The second part is “external monitoring mechanism.” (1) The debt ratio of a company does not significantly influence the corporate performance; therefore the relationship between debt ratio and corporate operating performance can not be proven. (2) When the parent company of a brand participates in investment and operation, the influence of the shareholding ratio of foreign corporations in the listed motor companies in Taiwan on the operating performance can not be confirmed due to the restrained and supervised operating conditions. (3) Most of the listed companies in Taiwan belong to the same group or family, and the controlling shareholders still have considerable influence on the boards of directors and supervisors. Hence, the monitoring function of external shareholders only limitedly influences the listed motor companies in Taiwan, and it does not help to increase the operating performance. It was explained in this study that corporate internal governance and external monitoring mechanisms have partial significant influence on corporate operating performance. The research results can be used as an important reference by authorities, creditors, investors, and other interested parties when they formulate policies and make investments.

參考文獻


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被引用紀錄


陳慶光(2016)。公司所有權結構與利益同化現象對企業價值與經營績效的影響〔碩士論文,中原大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6840%2fcycu201600614
趙麗春(2017)。董事會特性、經理人特質與股權結構對公司經營績效之影響〔碩士論文,長榮大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0015-2005201716580300

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