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  • 學位論文

台灣房仲產業廠商疆界的研究

The Study of Firm Boundary in Real Estate Brokerage Industry

指導教授 : 曲祉寧

摘要


台灣房仲產業之經營型態,可概分為直營體系、加盟連鎖與單店自營,其中因為房仲從業人員具備人力資產專屬性(human-asset specificity),容易對雇用公司產生挾持問題。故由交易成本經濟學(transaction cost economics)的觀點,公司對分店應該以直營的整合方式加以經營。不過,在房仲產業中,由於各家分店所面對的市場區隔不盡相同,各分店所在的市場競爭也彼此各異,因此,總部不太容易以統一而單調的經營方法,服務不太一樣的目標市場。如能給予各分店適當的自主權,將能激勵分店有效服務市場。而根據產權理論,如 Grossman, Hart and Moore 等人的模型的建議,將產權分配給掌握資產專屬性之一方形成激勵,應能有效激勵分店追求更大效益,即傾向分工,故支持加盟連鎖或自行創設單店。而不同的經營型態,在不同的環境條件下,將如何造成廠商疆界的變動,此為本研究所欲探討之問題。 本研究以台北市12個行政區為觀察對象,並區分景氣好壞、相對地價高低區域,分析直營體系與加盟單店之企業規模變動,即廠商疆界改變。結果顯示,價格因素並非影響之主因,不論地價高、低區域,其企業規模不受平均單價、平均總價、平均流通天數影響。而景氣因素所衍生之「預期心理」,對於經營據點產生影響。直營體系為避免挾持問題,多以「管理機制」作為手段。加盟單店型態,因將產權進行適當分配,即交由「市場機制」進行管理。反映在廠商疆界上,加盟單店型態較直營體系對於環境變動,有較佳的動態能力(Dynamic Capabilities)作為策略因應。

並列摘要


In Taiwan, the ownership of the branch stores in the real estate industry can be categorized into direct system, chain store and single shop, in which brokers, branch stores, own specific human assets. According to the transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975, 1985), the existence of asset specificities, the exogenous transaction cost, always induces the hold-up behavior, the endogenous transaction cost. When real estate headquarters intend to reduce opportunistic behaviors caused by sales agents in the branch stores, keeping the ownership of those branch stores, the downstream integration strategy, is an appropriate approach to reduce the hold-up problem. However, the different branch stores face different market segments. To improve the sales incentive of local branch store is one of key successful factors to survive in severe market competition. According to the property models raised by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), the GHM model, when sales agents keep the local ownership of branch stores, it provides the highest sales incentive for sales agents. It implies, disintegration policy, or the division of labor, between headquarter and branch stores will improve the business performance. In this thesis, we investigated real estate markets in Taipei city. We found that the transaction price, average unit price for real estate and the length of transaction duration has no effect on the firm boundary strategy, i.e., the integration or de-integration between the headquarters and branch stores. However, we do find out that the price expectation provides strong impacts and it is property right incentive dominates the transaction cost economics here in Taipei.

參考文獻


Coase, R. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4(16), pp. 386-405.
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986). The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. The Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), pp. 691-719.
Hart, O. D., & Moore, J. (1990). Property Right and the Nature of the Firm. The Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), pp. 1119-1158.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). Economic institutions of capitalism: New York:Free Press.
Woodruff, C. (2002). Non-contractible investments and vertical integration in the Mexican footwear industry. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(2002), pp. 1197-1224.

被引用紀錄


許傑銘(2013)。台灣不動產仲介業推行企業倫理關鍵成功因素之研究—以信義房屋為例〔碩士論文,中原大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6840%2fcycu201300037
鄧明宗(2010)。以交易成本專屬性探討台灣通訊經銷產業〔碩士論文,中原大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6840%2fcycu201000997

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