國共擴大接觸對兩岸關係的衝擊：2004-2006年

The Impacts of Enlarged Contacts between the CCP and the KMT on Cross-Strait Relations,2004-2006

余莓莓(Yu,Meimei)

指導教授 ： 陳延輝

國立臺灣師範大學/教育學院/政治學研究所/博士(2009年)

摘要

論文題目：國共擴大接觸對兩岸關係的衝擊:2004-2006年

畢業時間：2009年（九十七學年度第二學期博士學位論文摘要）
研究生姓名：余莓莓　　　　　　　　　　指導教授：陳延輝 博士

論文摘要：
二０００年總統大選，代表民進黨參選的陳水扁、呂秀蓮在泛藍陣營分裂的情況下贏得最終勝選，台灣完成首度的政黨輪替。以民進黨鮮明的「愛台」本土形象，更挾以新勝之師的氣勢與執政位置掌握的權力和資源，陳水扁原本擁有絕佳的歷史機會，對內改變台灣政壇生態重整政治版圖，對外免於背負「賣台」的包袱而能大開大立擘畫兩岸新局。然而，「核四」停工事件的粗率操作，使得原已士氣渙散的國民黨、親民黨同仇敵愾重新集結成「在野聯盟」，藍綠自此失去互信合作的機會，並從而開啟陳水扁兩任任期間朝野無止境的對抗。
在兩岸關係上，則陳水扁上任之初雖刻意採取「新中間路線」，從「四不一沒有」到「大膽講話」一再遞出和平橄欖枝，然而北京當局緣於對台戰略的考量，復加以對陳水扁卻乏信任，竟在陳水扁就任民進黨主席的就職典禮上以挖走台灣的邦交國諾魯做為回應，備感羞辱的陳水扁在兩岸關係上處於進無法得寸功，難以爭取中間選民認同更飽受深綠支持者質疑的尷尬境地，遂轉向退而固守深綠路線，一邊一國、公投、正名、制憲，一連串帶有強烈彰顯台灣主體意涵的政策主張與作為，雖然滿足深綠支持者的期待，但於此同時卻也每每被解讀為有改變現狀之虞的冒進舉措，民進黨政府成為美、中、泛藍眼中的「麻煩製造者」，這使得陳水扁第一個任期並未能拉近與國共間的關係，卻更與美國的關係不斷惡化，兩岸僵局遲遲無法打開的困境，可以說也為「連宋登陸」提供了一個有利的空間。連胡甚至倡立了兩岸經貿論壇。
連戰、宋楚瑜高調訪問中國大陸，並分別與中共最高領導人胡錦濤簽訂「連胡公報」、「宋胡公報」，面對此一明顯違背「兩岸人民關係條例」的觸法行為，民進黨政府既未予以事先強力的遏止，更欠缺事後執行法律規範的處罰，錯失先機的陳水扁政權由是自陷於不利的被動境地，只能眼見連宋登陸後紅藍的擴大接觸與合作，帶動兩岸民間社會與經濟更蓬勃的交流，兩岸「紅藍綠」小三角關係逐漸發展形成「紅藍制綠」的新結構，民進黨落入勢孤的一方。面對此一態勢，陳水扁決定在經濟上以「積極管理」取代「積極開放」，試圖減緩並降低中國大陸對台的磁吸效應，然而，從國會殿堂泛藍以過半優勢結合輿論造勢挑戰民進黨政府的兩岸經貿政策，到「兩岸經貿論壇」眾多台灣工商鉅子不避形跡地出席與表態，在在顯示民進黨政府的「積極管理」政策在因應新局方面的力有未逮；政治上，陳水扁以「終統」扳回向中傾斜的天平，卻招來美國、中共和泛藍強烈的不滿與反彈，華府、北京、泛藍對反獨採取一致立場，而民進黨成為對立的一方。民進黨在兩岸三邊四角的歷史舞台更見遠離，在整體結構上由「紅藍綠」小三角連動到「美中台」大三角，民進黨政府雙雙落入陷孤立與邊陲化的命運。由此結構發展趨勢觀察，連宋登陸一事，雖然只是歷史上小小的一個動作，但其對於「向中趨近」的動力，卻多少起了「轉轍」（switch）或「推進」的作用。

關鍵字

連宋登陸 ； 兩岸關係 ； 現狀 ； 兩岸經貿論壇 ； 邊陲化

並列摘要

National Taiwan Normal University Graduate Institute of Political Science
Title of Thesis：The Impacts of Enlarged Contacts between the CCP and the KMT on Cross-Strait Relations, 2004-2006
Year: 2009

Student：Yu, Meimei Advisor : Chen,Yenhui Ph.D.

Abstract :

President Chen, Shuibian and Vice President Annette Lu won the presidential election 2000 thanks to the split of the pan-blue camp. With a Taiwan-born party, President Chen was given unusual opportunities and resources to change domestic political ecology and to foster cross-strait relationship refraining from the burden of selling Taiwan out. Nevertheless, the rush and rough policy process for ceasing the Fourth Nuclear Project had antagonized the disorganized Kuomintang and the People's First Party and coincidentally pushed them to reunite together, fighting against the ruling Democratic Progressive Party. Since then, Chen administration had lost confidence and got involved endless boycotts from the pan-blue opposition parties.
As for cross-strait relations, Beijing authorities, excepting for its strategic concerns, had been highly suspicious of Chen's independence position even though Chen tried very hard to reach out his olive branch to Beijing. Beijing even grasped Taiwan's diplomatic ally Nauru away during Chen inaugurating his DPP chairmanship. Being humiliated by Beijing and, in addition, suspected by the green camp for his not earning much support from the middle-liners over China policy, Chen turned back to the dark-green line by putting forth a series of pro-independence countermeasures, such as proposing “One country on Either Side, ” “Referendum, ” “Rectification of Names,” and “ Rewriting the Constitution ” etc. Nevertheless, Chen's radical approaches appeasing his green supporters were interpreted as a move toward changing the status quo, as was opposed to the US position as well as China and the pan-blue's political interests. Chen became a trouble-maker for the temporarily strategic triad. Apparently, the cross-strait stalemate and the deteriorating US-Taiwan relationship offered an advantageous space for Lien-Soong's visits to China. Lien and Hu Jintao even initiated the Cross-Strait Economic Forum. Lien and Soong signed with Hu respectively “ Lien-Hu Joint Announcement” as well as “Soong-Hu Joint Announcement.”
Ironically, Chen administration seemed helpless and pale in dealing with Lien-Soong's visits to China before and after, as were obviously opposed to “The Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area”. From then on, the ruling DPP had been further marginalized while the closer cooperation and contacts between the KMT and the CCP had brought about more vibrant social and economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. The Red-Blue alliance to constrain the Green is emerging. In coping with this trend, Chen decided to alleviate China's economic magnetic effects by replacing “Active Opening” with “Active Management”, but his policy was severely challenged by the KMT's triumph at the legislature as well as the strong presence of tycoons' business interests. Chen's another move to abolish both the Unification Guidelines and the National Unification Council also encountered fierce protests and strong backfire from the pan-blue camps, China, and the US. The ruling DPP become the opposite party against the triad of anti-independence. The DPP then was pushed to the corner of the quadrangular relations. From a historical point of view, Lien-Soong' China visits, though a small step in the history of cross-strait relations, do play as a significant switch or facilitator to make Taiwan lean toward China.

並列關鍵字

Lien-Soong's Visits to China ； Cross-Strait Relations ； Status Quo ； Cross-Strait Economic Forum ； Marginalization

參考文獻

朱俊豪（2005），《從我國大陸政策比較國民黨與民進黨執政時期之國家利益觀》，淡江大學中國大陸研究所碩士論文。

劉建飛（2006），＜從中美戰略經濟對話看美國對華政策＞，【線上資料】，

雷立芬（2006），＜國共兩黨「兩岸農業合作論壇」之檢討建言＞，《海峽評論》，2006年11月，頁57-58。

楊志誠（2005），＜兩岸關係的新形勢：從《反分裂國家法》到連宋登陸＞，台北：海峽評論。

Lin, Cheng-yi and Lin, Wen-cheng (2005), “ Democracy, Divided National Identity, and Taiwan’s National Security,” Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 1, No.2, pp.69-87