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  • 學位論文

訊息分享對最適合併政策之影響

Effects of Information Sharing on Optimal Merger Policy

指導教授 : 謝修
共同指導教授 : 陳孝琪(Hsiao-Chi Chen)
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摘要


本論文是以政府如何制定最適合併政策為主軸的三篇文章所組成。在這三篇文章中,我們假設市場需求的相關訊息只能透過合併的方式取得。其中第二章及第三章,主要在分析廠商水平合併的最適政策。在這兩章中,廠商透過合併,不但可取得市場需求的相關訊息,亦可獲取成本降低技術。但這兩章的主要差別,在於第三章中廠商取得技術的方式除了合併外,另一項管道為技術授權。第四章則在探討當廠商以垂直合併或授權的方式取得新技術時,政府如何制定最適的垂直合併政策。 首先,由第二章的分析可知在 Cournot 競爭下,若市場需求波動幅度相當大時,政府應允許廠商合併;若市場需求波動幅度較小,則只有當新技術的成本降幅夠大時,政府才應允許廠商合併。反觀 Bertrand 競爭,只有當產品間的替代性較低,需求波動幅度較小,且成本降幅夠大時,政府才應允許廠商合併。 若廠商多了授權的技術移轉方式時,第三章的分析得到:專利擁有廠商偏好以二部制權利金的方式授權。其次,當市場上為 Cournot 競爭時,若市場需求波動幅度很大,政府當局應允許廠商合併;但 Bertrand 競爭時,政府應禁止廠商合併。再者,當訊息分享效果對福利水準的影響較小時,政府最適合併政策的制定會因廠商的授權方式而異,更明確的說,當新技術的成本降幅愈大,政府愈應允許廠商合併。 最後,論文的第四章探討政府的最適垂直合併政策,透過分析得出不論市場競爭是 Cournot 競爭或 Bertrand 競爭,訊息分享效果皆會提升廠商垂直整合後的利潤,但會減損社會福利。因此,不論市場需求波動幅度大小,在 Cournot 競爭下,政府都應禁止廠商垂直整合;但在 Bertrand 競爭下,若上下游廠商合併後的價格扭曲效果較小時,則政府可允許廠商垂直整合。

並列摘要


The dissertation consists of three articles related to the antitrust authority’s optimal merger policy. In these articles, market information is shared only through a merger. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we discuss the way how authority formulates the optimal policy about a horizontal merger. The main difference between these two chapters lies in the way via which a cost-reducing technology is transferred. The technology is transferred only via a merger in Chapter 2, while it can be transferred either through a merger or a license in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we investigate the optimal vertical merger policy with mergers and licensing as two alternative means for transferring a cost-reducing technology. In Chapter 2, we show that the optimal merger policy differs under Cournot and Bertrand competition. When firms compete in the Cournot fashion, the authority allows a merger under the conditions of (1) high degree of market fluctuations, or (2) low degree of market fluctuations plus large enough cost reduction. If firms compete in the Bertrand fashion, a merger could be allowed only under the situations with low degree of market fluctuations, large enough cost-reducing innovations, and low degree of product differentiation. In Chapter 3, we investigate the antitrust authority’s optimal merger policy in a duopoly model with cost asymmetry and asymmetric information regarding uncertain demand. We first show that if the licensing instrument could be chosen endogenously, then two-part tariff licensing is the most preferred means. We next show that the optimal merger policy differs under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. If the degree of market fluctuations is large, then a merger should be allowed under Cournot competition, while it should be forbidden under Bertrand competition. On the other hand, if the degree of market fluctuations is low, then the possibility of allowing a merger is increasing with the size of innovations. In Chapter 4, we study issues related to the antitrust authority’s optimal vertical merger policy. We find that the profit effects of information sharing are positive while the welfare effects of information sharing are negative under both price-setting and quantity-setting regimes. Mergers should never be allowed under Cournot competition, while mergers could be allowed under some circumstances when firms compete in the Bertrand fashion.

參考文獻


Banal-Estañol, A., 2007. “Information-Sharing Implications of Horizontal Mergers,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 25, 31-49.
Deneckere, R., and C. Davidson, 1985. “Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition,” RAND Journal of Economics 16, 473-486.
Fried, D., 1984. “Incentives for Information Production and Disclosure in a Duopolistic Environment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 99, 367-381.
Gal-Or, E., 1985. “Information Sharing in Oligopoly,” Econometrica 53, 329-343.
Gal-Or, E., 1988. “The Informational Advantages or Disadvantages of Horizontal Mergers,” International Economic Review 29, 639-661.

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