財會準則對管理者決策之影響－以可轉換公司債之處理為例

The Effect of Different Accounting Methods for Convertible Bonds on the Managers' Investment Decisions

劉奕麟(Yi-Lin Liu)

指導教授 ： 邱士宗

國立臺北大學/商學院/會計學系/碩士(2009年)

摘要

本研究主要以代理理論的觀點，建立一簡單分析性模型，探討管理者的投資決策是否會因可轉換公司債的會計處理方法不同而造成差異？另外，本研究亦探討哪些因素會影響該種差異。

　　研究結果顯示，當管理者為風險規避者時，該項差異確實可能存在。另外，公司轉換損益的大小、管理者誘因的強度、管理者期初財富的多寡、以及計畫的風險及報酬等等，皆是影響計畫選擇差異的因素。

關鍵字

財會準則 ； 投資決策 ； 可轉換公司債 ； 代理理論

並列摘要

In this paper, we develop an analytical model to study if managers’investment decisions would differ between various accounting methods for convertible bonds. We also try to investigate the factors that would affect the difference.

The result shows that, the difference might exist when managers are risk averse. Besides, other factors such as gains or losses on bond conversion, the intensity of incentives for the managers, managers' initial wealth, and risk and return of the projects also affect the decisions, and there are also interdependences among these factors.

並列關鍵字

accounting methods ； investment decisions ； convertible bonds ； agency theory

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