盜伐集團的組織與運作模式

The Organization and Operation of Illegal Logging

呂叔瑋(Leu, Shwu-Woei)

指導教授 ： 周愫嫻

國立臺北大學/社會科學學院/犯罪學研究所/碩士(2011年)

摘要

為瞭解諱莫如深的盜伐集團，本研究採質性研究之深度訪談法，對十位服刑中之盜伐者進行訪談，這十位受訪者在盜伐犯罪中，各自是扮演帶頭者、共犯、帶路者、買家、卡車司機等角色，且分別是隸屬於大型盜伐、盜挖七里香及盜取樹瘤等集團，其作案地點則是散布在臺灣本島的北部、南部及東部。
本研究發現，受訪者參與盜伐的內在動機有四：1.高中以下學歷、有前科難謀高薪正職想從盜伐獲取較高報酬；2.買毒缺錢不惜鋌而走險；3.趨附從事盜伐朋友的邀約或慫恿；4.滿足個人蒐藏玩賞的興趣。受訪者參與盜伐的外在誘因有七：1.因現有職業容易從事或接觸盜伐犯罪；2.每人每趟盜伐報酬從數萬元到上百萬元；3.時間自由不像上班綁死死的，還可以訓練體力；4.買主好多！因為這個東西，只會少，不會多；5.路很遠，巡山員也不會來；6.我敢說他們百分之百追不到，我們敢衝，他們不一定敢衝；7.因為判刑輕、錢擱賺撂多。盜伐集團的組織特性有五：1.扁平性組織，有帶頭、分工，幾無垂直管理；2.組織規模通常不大，核心成員約3-5人；3.集團成員多以中壯年男性為主，幾無女性；4.略具常業特性，較無暴力特性；5.大型盜伐集團的成員多具黑道背景。盜伐集團的運作模式有八：1.以珍貴林木為盜伐標的；2.挑人少時段為作案時機；3.採人贓分離或遮蔽隱藏的運送方式；4.以電動鍊鋸、卡車或貨車為主要伐運工具；5.通訊聯繫不用暗語但會謹慎對話；6.主要核心成員常具親友關係；7.有特定管道在專門收贓；8.大型盜伐集團常會行賄勾結官員。最後，本研究結論為：以「理性選擇理論」解釋盜伐者動機，及用「日常活動理論」分析盜伐集團的運作模式，並將研究發現依「情境犯罪預防理論」提出預防盜伐之策略。

關鍵詞：盜伐;盜伐者

關鍵字

盜伐 ； 盜伐者

並列摘要

To examine the problem of illegal logging, this study used in-depth interviews as a qualitative methodology, carrying out interviews with ten prisoners. The ten interviewees separately played roles as crime leader, conspirator, route guide, stolen-log-receiver, and truck driver and so on and they were individually working within a wide-ranging illegal logging organization, smuggling murraya paniculata and tuberculate-wart. The illegal logging mainly spreads across in north, south and east inland Taiwan.
This study identified: four psychological motives of interviewees who participated in illegal logging: (1) not graduated from high school and with criminal records not able to find a normal job with sufficient salary, (2) taking risk to break law due to lack of money to buy drugs, (3) close to illegal logger, inviting or inciting to attend, (4) fulfilling private interest in treasure searching;
seven external ‘attractors’: (1) current job easy to commit and undertake illegal logging crime, (2) vast remuneration from illegal jogging, (3) free working hours and able to get a body-training effect, (4) plenty of stolen-log receivers, plus the quantities of particular log is decreasing, not increasing, (5) distant from outer world and little likelihood of forest patrol presence (6 ) patrol unlikely to give chase (7) the sentence for conviction of illegal logging is perceived to be lenient, in contrast to likely financial rewards;
five specific features of illegal logging organizations: (1) flat organization, criminal leader conducting with horizontal job assignment, little vertical job assigned, (2) core members mainly three to five people, (3) major party members are in middle age, male, almost no females, (4) committing illegal logging as long term job, no violent tendency, (5) members of large scale illegal logging mostly have general background in organized gang.
and several operating patterns : (1) the target of illegal logging focuses on precious timber, (2) committing illegal logging crime when people unlikely to appear, (3) delivery of stolen logs is separate from transport of the criminals, (4) utilizing electrical saw, truck or pick-up as criminal tools, (5) communicate not using password, but prudent wordings, (6) main core members are close relatives or friends, (7) special selling channel to receiver of stolen log, (8) large scale illegal logging often involving bribery to government officials.
This study made conclusions and applied Rational Choice Theory in elucidating the motives of illegal loggers, applied Routine Activities Theory in analyzing operation patterns of illegal logging, and applied Situational Crime Prevention Theory in the preventive strategy against illegal logging.
Keywords: illegal logging; illegal logger

並列關鍵字

illegal logging ； illegal logger

參考文獻

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