影響都市更新案通過核定因素之研究-以台北市市有土地參與案為例

The Determinants of Approval on Urban Regeneration Projects –An Empirical Study on Taipei City

朱大成(TA-CHENG CHU)

指導教授 ： 羅清俊

國立臺北大學/公共事務學院/公共行政暨政策學系碩士在職專班/碩士(2016年)

摘要

本研究以台北市政府從2000年到2014年底參與民間開發商主導申請核定的都市更新案為觀察對象，分析影響更新案通過核定及通過核定所需時間的實質客觀因素以及政治因素。首先，想要瞭解這些更新案通過核定及所需時間的情形，更新案在各年度通過核定及所需時間的分布情形，以及在台北市的各行政區通過核定及所需時間的分布情形。第二，利用邏輯斯迴歸模型檢視影響這些更新案通過核定的實質客觀因素為何？是案件座落區位？權利關係人組成？還是案件申請的容積獎勵額度？影響這些更新案通過核定的政治因素又為何？是市長與市議員？還是政治獻金？還是選舉與政黨？最後，利用OLS線性迴歸模型分析這些自變數對於更新案通過核定所需時間的影響情形。
根據邏輯斯迴歸模型的統計結果，我們發現實質客觀因素以及政治因素對於更新案通過核定與否，都分別扮演一定程度的影響力。更新案的容積奬勵越高，更新案通過核定的機會就越大。此外，更新案座落市長選舉得票率較高的選區，以及更新案開發商捐獻較多的政治獻金給市長，更新案都比較容易通過核定。而這些發現也意味著，更新案所帶來的政治利益吸引著政治人物熱情的投入其中。而OLS線性迴歸模型的統計結果，也有同樣的發現。

關鍵字

都市更新 ； 容積獎勵 ； 市長 ； 市議員 ； 政治獻金 ； 選舉

並列摘要

This paper explores the determinants of approval on urban regeneration projects in Taipei City from 2000 to 2014. These projects are literally developed by private investors, yet city-owned lands are involved and City Hall has final say on the approval of projects. In this paper, descriptively we ask how these projects are distributed in the jurisdictions of Taipei City and across time within the period we analyze. Furthermore, by conducting logistic regression, we investigate the determinants of the approval on urban regeneration projects. Two sets of factors are considered. The first one is the objective criteria such as the compositions of stake-holders, the location of projects, and the incentive of the bulk reward. The second one is politics-related factors such as the amounts of political contribution that the investors donated to the mayor or councilor, and the votes share that mayor received in the previous election at the location of the regeneration project. Finally, OLS is employed to estimate why some projects had been approved quickly.
According to the statistical results of logistic regression, we find that political influences and objective criteria are both playing roles in the decision process. Projects claimed more bulk rewards are easily approved. Besides, projects located in the area where mayor had higher percentage of votes share, project investors who donated more political contribution to the mayor, are also likely to be approved. These findings imply that even though the regeneration projects are quite neutral for renewing urban areas, they are still embraced political benefits attracting political actors enthusiastically get involved. The findings of OLS model have the same pattern as well.

並列關鍵字

urban regeneration ； bulk reward ； political contribution ； election

參考文獻

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