捐獻社會基本財動機之獨裁者實驗研究

Generous Giving in the Dictator Game Motivated by Offering Primary Social Goods

范姜儀(FAN-JIANG YI)

指導教授 ： 鄧軫元 ； 彭惠君

國立臺北大學/公共事務學院/財政學系/碩士(2016年)

摘要

先前的研究顯示捐獻結果大多不顯著，即使顯著也是建立在無知之幕的前提下。因此本研究修改實驗設計，屏除了無知之幕也就是排除了風險的因素。此外，本研究考量了捐獻的標的物不只侷限於金錢，還加入了社會基本財的概念。藉由獨裁者實驗，本研究欲探討人們是否會因為他人的需求而有捐獻行為。
　　實驗分為對照組和實驗組，對照組的設計如同傳統的獨裁者實驗，而實驗組則是設立一個可以得到社會基本財的門檻值。實驗結果驗證理論的預期，對照組的受試者如同一般的獨裁者實驗，表現出利己主義；而實驗組的受試者解釋了人們的確會在乎他人的需求，願意犧牲一點自己的所得來幫助需要幫助的人。

關鍵字

獨裁者實驗 ； 社會基本財 ； 捐獻

並列摘要

The previous studies have shown that most of the results of donation were not significant except they were built on the premise of the veil of ignorance. In this study, we modify the experimental design to exclude the veil of ignorance which is the factor of risk. Furthermore, we consider that the target of donation people care about is not limited to money but the primary social goods. By conducting a lab experiment of the dictator game, we try to investigate whether people make donations is because of the needs of others.
　　The experiments are divided into the control and the experimental group. The design of the control group is the same as the traditional dictator game, while the experimental group is to establish a threshold value which decides whether or not people can obtain the primary social goods. The results of experiments support the theoretical predictions. Subjects in the control group show egoism as in the general experiments of the dictator game. But the subjects in the experimental group show that people really care about the needs of others, and are willing to sacrifice a bit of their payoffs to help people in need.

並列關鍵字

dictator game ； primary social goods ； generous giving

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