管理者與審計人員勾結問題之分析性研究

AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE ISSUE OF COLLUSIONS BETWEEN MANAGERS AND AUDITORS

張暐正(WEI-CHENG CHANG)

指導教授 ： 邱士宗

國立臺北大學/商學院/會計學系/碩士(2016年)

摘要

本文以分析性研究之方式 探討公司管理者與會計師的勾結行為模，以瞭 解使公司管理者與會計師發生勾結的條件。當經理人與審計員間存在勾結時，公司權益可能因此受到損害而不意被公司察覺，故為了降低公司因勾結產生之不當影響及保護業主權益，本文欲探討在何種條件成立時，經理人與審計人員較易發生勾結之行為；並進一步探討如何能幫助公司降低經理人與審計人員勾結之可能性。
研究結果顯示，當公司能:
(1)建立及加強落實公司治理(例如:審計委員會、強化企業之內部控制)
(2)提高公司管理者及會計師因法律訴訟所需賠償的損失或增加經理人之持股比例及提高存在勾結而發生訴訟機率，則越能減少人與會計師相互勾結的可能性，並促使經 理人誠實報導並 能維持會計師的獨立性。

關鍵字

會計師 ； 勾結 ； 賽局理論

並列摘要

This study discusses the issue of collusions between managers and auditors. In order to reduce the damage of company from collusions between managers and auditors, we specifically want to derive the condition for the managers to collude successfully with auditors. Furthermore, we investigate what company can do to reduce the possibility of collusions between managers and auditors.
The results show the ways companies can reduce the possibility of collusions between managers and auditors include:
1. Build and enhance the implementation of corporate governance.
2. Increase legal liability for the managers and auditors or increase managers’ proportion of shareholdings.

並列關鍵字

Accountants ； Collusion ； Game theory

參考文獻

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